The war began for me on the Leningrad front in early March 1942. I commanded the 140th separate rifle brigade, which arrived at the front from Siberia, and exactly one year later, in March 1943, I was appointed commander of the 311th rifle division and went with it all the way from Volkhov to the Elbe.

These two compounds are equally dear to my heart. The first very heavy, bloody battles as part of the 140th brigade near Lyuban and Sinyavino cannot be forgotten even after decades - they stuck like a nail in my memory.

It was not easy in the 311th division either, when we fought for Leningrad as part of the Volkhov Front, diverting enemy forces to ourselves. But that was later, when many of us already had little combat experience gained in the battles of 1942.

The 140th brigade, having arrived at the front, became part of the newly organized 4th Guards Rifle Corps, which consisted of the 3rd Guards Rifle Division, four separate rifle brigades and artillery units. The corps commander was Major General Nikolai Aleksandrovich Hagen, a combatant, competent commander. He received me and Brigadier Commissar Boris Mikhailovich Lupolover at a command post near the city of Volkhov. We reported to him in detail about the combat composition of the brigade, its staffing and combat readiness. The corps commander listened attentively to us and, as it seemed to us, was satisfied with the detailed reports. The general asked which of us had already participated in this war. Having received a negative answer, he visibly drooped, grew gloomy, and already looked at us without much sympathy.

Unfortunately, I looked younger than my 36 years and, apparently, made an unfavorable impression on the corps commander. The restraint and lack of self-confidence in my behavior he obviously regarded as weakness and inexperience.

Coming out of the dugout of the corps commander, the commissar and I decided that the conversation with Hagen, as they say, "began with a slick surface, and ended with a reptile." The sudden coldness of the corps commander in relation to us, commanders who had not yet been fired upon in this war, left an unpleasant aftertaste. But we tried not to lose heart, hoping to show ourselves and the brigade from the best side in the very first battles.

I was a career officer, from the age of 16 in the ranks of the Red Army. In the past, he took part in battles. More than once I had the opportunity to test myself as a commander who knows how to find the right solution in a difficult situation. And even now I was here only because I repeatedly asked the commander of the Siberian Military District to go to the front, believing that my military training and desire to fight the enemy of the Fatherland would be useful to the army in the field.

As you know, in the first half of 1942, fierce battles unfolded west of the Volkhov River in order to break through the blockade of Leningrad by our troops. In early January 1942, the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts went on the offensive.

The main blow from the area north of Novgorod in the north-western direction to Lyuban was delivered by the 2nd shock army of the Volkhov Front. Formations of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front from the line of Voronov, Maluksa, the southern shore of the Sokoly Mokh swamp were attacking Tosno. For two months (January, February), units of the 54th Army attacked the enemy with extraordinary persistence day after day. In order to speed up the defeat of the grouping of German troops in the Lyuban region, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief demanded that the commander of the Leningrad Front launch an offensive with the forces of the 54th Army from the north in the direction of Lyuban towards the grouping of the Volkhov Front.

On March 9, as a result of an attack by units of the 54th Army, the Nazis left Art. Pogostya, Zharok junction, forest and glades adjacent to Pogost. However, further attempts by our troops to develop a breakthrough were not successful.

On March 15, the commander of the 54th Army, General I. I. Fedyuninsky, set the task for the 4th Guards Rifle Corps: from the morning of March 16, go on the offensive, striking in the general direction of Zenino, Smerdynia in order to defeat the opposing enemy and by the end of the day reach depth up to 6 km, so that later, as we move forward, to increase the blow.

As a survey of prisoners showed, the Germans were waiting for the corps to attack a day earlier, that is, on Sunday, saying: "The Russians always spoil our holiday."

The battle order of the corps was built in three echelons: the first echelon - the 284th rifle division with the 16th tank brigade, the 3rd guards rifle division with the 124th and 98th tank brigades and the 285th rifle division; the second echelon - the 33rd and 32nd separate rifle brigades; the third echelon - the 137th and 140th separate rifle brigades (rifle divisions, except for the 3rd Guards Rifle Division, were part of the corps only for the duration of the breakthrough).

On the morning of March 16, units of the first echelon of the corps went on the offensive. Breaking through the defenses and pushing the enemy, they slowly, with heavy losses, moved forward. Deep snow and thickets of alder forest made it difficult to use tanks, artillery and guns for direct fire.

For five days of continuous hostilities, despite the heroism of soldiers and officers, units of the first two echelons advanced only 6-10 km and reached the line of the Korodynka River, the villages of Zenino, Dubovik. Later, due to the increased width of the front and heavy losses, the offensive of the corps slowed down even more.

It should be clarified here that the Germans, who were thrown back in December 1941 to the Mga-Kirishi railway line, immediately switched to organized defense. Two full months before the start of the Luban operation, they were engaged in setting up defensive positions on all hills and other places convenient for defense and turned them into fairly strong strongholds and lines. All huts, barns and sheds in settlements were turned into bunkers. The roofs were removed from the buildings and next to the log house, from the outside, a second log house was placed. The gaps between the log cabins were covered with earth. Window openings, partially covered with logs, served as loopholes, or loopholes were specially cut into the walls of houses. From the outside, these log cabins were filled up and compacted with snow, which made them difficult to observe. Machine guns were installed in each such defensive structure, and in some - artillery pieces and mortars. Outside settlements, walls (fences) were used, made of logs with loopholes up to one meter high, 80–90 cm wide and 5–6 m or more long, and in low places log decks were laid for prone shooting. Our troops, conducting an offensive against an enemy who had strengthened in advance, were forced to operate in very difficult conditions, for which, it must be said frankly, they were not yet prepared at that time.

From the beginning of the march until the entry of the 140th brigade into battle, parts of the brigade moved at night knee-deep in snow for sixteen days. Each step required great physical exertion, which exhausted the forces of the fighters. Undersized Mongolian horses fell into the snow to the very belly and with their last strength pulled wagons, mortars and artillery pieces, stopping every 40-50 m. Cars skidded in the snow, and they were pushed by teams assigned for this purpose. In some places, cars dug into snowdrifts and got stuck. While they were being pulled out, the columns stopped, and the tired fighters stood dozing. Less hardy, leaving the road, lay down in the snow. They were found, awakened, lifted to their feet and dragged forward until they came to their senses.

When dawn came, parts of the brigade took refuge in the forest for a daytime halt. Excited on the march, people soaked with sweat did not feel the cold for the first minutes, although the frost reached 20 degrees, fell into the snow and, huddled closer to each other, fell asleep. Frost quickly grabbed the wet backs of the fighters who were chilled to the bone and raised them to their feet again.

In non-flying weather it was allowed to make fires, but even this measure did not bring much relief. Few of the commanders and fighters knew how to really put up huts from the branches of coniferous trees. The wind blew through them, blowing out the heat. The fighters lay down closer to the fire and tossed and turned all the time, exposing the fire to one side or the other. Thus passed the hours of daytime rest in the struggle against the piercing cold for precious minutes of sleep. Daytime halts turned into real torture, and people grew weaker and weaker. With each halt, the number of those with a cold grew, and there was nothing to replace the burnt sheepskin coats and felt boots. Already on March 10, the corps commander, Major General H. A. Hagen, was forced to convey to the army commander: “The roads are difficult, the personnel and horsemen of the 137th and 140th brigades are overworked.”

On cloudless days, German planes ironed the sky in search of corps troops. Junkers raided and bombed several times, but, thanks to the dispersed location of the units at a halt and good camouflage, the losses in the brigade were insignificant.

Despite excessive physical fatigue, the personnel continued to endure the hardships of the winter march. The fighters knew well that the army was fighting to lift the blockade of Leningrad, and this supported their spirit. They courageously endured the difficult conditions of the campaign. During the first ten days of the march, 47 applications for admission to the party were submitted.

From the day the corps entered the battle, the 140th brigade, with long stops, slowly advanced behind the advancing parts of the corps. For some reason, we were not informed about the situation. We could judge about it by the slow advance of the units operating in front of us, the roar of enemy artillery and mortar fire, the number of people killed on the path of our movement and the flow of wounded soldiers. With the onset of darkness, the Germans strenuously illuminated the approaches to their front line with rockets. From the fires of the rockets, we determined the front line, which was a slightly elongated circle with a very narrow gap at the Zharok junction.

The brigade could be brought into battle every minute, so it had to be constantly in full combat readiness, and the forces of the fighters were melting every day, the number of people with colds and exhausted to the extreme was growing. This caused great concern among the command and political staff of the brigade. The officers understood that it was necessary at all costs to preserve the strength of the fighters until the first decisive battle. We attached great importance to baptism of fire. Its success was supposed to strengthen the confidence of units and subunits in their forces, which would be of considerable importance for subsequent battles.

But what could really be done in these difficult conditions? The soldiers were freezing, lacking sleep and losing strength. On the morning of March 21, from the starting position to the west of elev. On May 36, the 137th brigade was brought into battle with the task of breaking through the enemy defenses on the Korodynka River and reaching the area of ​​the sheds. At the same time, the task was set for the 140th brigade to advance behind the left flank of the 137th brigade, destroying the remaining enemy groups and be ready to act in accordance with the situation on special orders.

Advancing behind the left flank of the 137th brigade, by 07:00 on March 23, the brigade reached the mark. 40.6 north of Zenino and concentrated in a dense forest five kilometers from the supposed edge of the enemy’s defense. The day before, the 3rd battalion of the brigade was sent by order of the headquarters of the corps to the village of Malinovka to eliminate the enemy submachine gunners who had broken through.

Before the units had time to settle in the forest, the enemy suddenly fell with the fire of two batteries in the area of ​​​​the 1st battalion and the headquarters of the brigade. This raid puzzled us. German planes did not appear that day, and due to the conditions of the terrain, the enemy did not have the opportunity to observe the movement and concentration of parts of the brigade. And yet the enemy somehow discovered us.

Later it became known that, in addition to machine gunners, the Nazis sent intelligence officers dressed in the uniform of the Soviet Army to the areas where our troops were located. They gave signals by radio or rockets about the location of our units. Having no experience, we did not yet know how to deal with this.

Finally, it was our turn to fight. On the entire front of the army there were unsuccessful battles. The enemy was well fortified in settlements, along roads, ravines and rivers, occupying all the dominating points in the area. Repelling the attacks of our units and feeling for weaknesses in their battle formations, the enemy went over to short counterattacks, always well supported by concentrated artillery and mortar fire.

“The 140th brigade, providing junctions with the 137th brigade and the 3rd Guards Rifle Division, advance in order to capture the Khvoynaya grove area, cut the Konduya-Smerdynia road, meaning to be ready to repel enemy counterattacks from the directions of Makaryevskaya Hermitage and Smerdyn, assisting part of the forces of the 3rd Guards Rifle Division in capturing the Smerdyn, Dobroe, Vasino area. This brigade had to fulfill the task on its own without its 3rd battalion and any reinforcement.

A strip of solid swamp overgrown with forest, more than 4 km deep, separated the brigade from the enemy. A thick alder forest stood before us like a wall. Through this obstacle it was necessary to break through, as in the Indian jungle. In addition, there was deep snow in the forest. In the direction of our advance, there was a single very narrow clearing, which we decided to use to approach the enemy. We did not find any traces of human feet in the snow - both on the clearing itself and in the forest.

Prior to the start of the battle, the brigade headquarters did not have any data on the enemy's defense, his forces and grouping. In general terms, it was known that the Germans were occupying the Khvoynaya grove, which the brigade was supposed to take possession of. We did not have direct contact and communication with our neighbors. In order to install it with the 137th brigade and the 3rd guards division, groups of fighters were sent, who disappeared without a trace, apparently stumbling into enemy ambushes. When units moved along a single clearing, an ambush could be expected at every step. In order to avoid this and timely establish the outline of the front line of the German defense, a reconnaissance company was sent forward with the task of deploying in a chain, combing the forest in the brigade's lane and, moving towards the Khvoynaya grove, to come into contact with the enemy.

When the reconnaissance company withdrew to a distance of one kilometer, parts of the brigade began to advance towards the clearing. The 1st battalion of Major G.E. Nazarov moved at the head of the column, followed by the 2nd battalion of Major K.A. Kunichev. The artillery of the brigade moved behind the rifle battalions. The command of the brigade was at the head of the column.

The sappers of junior lieutenant S.P. Partsevsky and part of the shooters, armed with axes and saws, chopped and sawed trees to expand the clearing and make it suitable for the movement of artillery systems and wagons with mortars and ammunition. Work was slow at first, but soon got better, and the 1st battalion began to be drawn into the forest. Around - silence. Not a single shot from the enemy. There were no reports from intelligence.

Laying a road ahead of them, Nazarov's battalion went deeper and deeper into the forest. It seemed that nothing foreshadowed danger, when suddenly the air was shaken by explosions of shells. With rapid fire from one artillery battery, the enemy fell on the column of the 1st battalion. From the accuracy of the fire, it was clear that the enemy was following our movement, although, as before, observation from the ground and air was excluded, and our reconnaissance was operating ahead. We had no choice but to break forward faster and, in order to avoid losses, increase the distance between the battalion units. Artillery raids were repeated methodically every 10-15 minutes.

While the battalions made their way through the thicket of the forest, the reconnaissance company, having passed a swamp overgrown with forest and not meeting the enemy on its way, came to the edge of a long forest clearing, behind which dense vegetation again began three hundred meters away.

Before crossing the open area, the company commander had to send forward a reconnaissance patrol. But Lieutenant P. E. Kartoshkin did not do this, and the company, deployed in a chain, moved along the clearing, without having patrols ahead. When she approached the middle of the clearing, a signal flare went up from the edge of the forest, to which there were less than 150 m. Before the scouts even thought about the danger, machine guns and machine guns crackled and mines exploded. Only deep snow, in which the fighters buried themselves, saved the company from destruction.

At this time, the 1st battalion was approaching a forest clearing, and the enemy ambush, apparently fearing a detour, hastily withdrew. The reconnaissance, however, suffered significant damage.

At dusk, the battalion approached the Khvoynaya grove, to the east of which the front line of the German defense passed. It was already dark when the battalion took up the starting line for the attack. The Nazis hid 100-150 meters ahead.

Behind the first battalion, 300–400 m deep, the 2nd battalion lay down. Artillery battalions were stuck in the forest, as the horses were completely exhausted.

On this day, it became sharply warmer, and the exhausted soldiers of the 1st battalion, having taken up positions and somehow dug in the snow, immediately fell into a dead sleep. Brigade commissar B. M. Lupolover, brigade chief of staff Major E. N. Mokshev, and battalion and company commanders and I were in combat formations of rifle subunits all night in order to prevent a possible night attack by the enemy in time. The Germans, expecting our night attack, kept their guard. They did not dare to take active actions, yielding to us in the number of manpower. This saved us from the tragedy that could have unfolded that night.

In the morning the Germans opened fierce fire from all machine guns and machine guns. We were separated by dense undergrowth. We did not see each other, but this did not prevent the Germans from continuously scribbling along the entire front, sparing no cartridges.

Our soldiers did not fire. The artillery of the brigade had just managed to reach the area of ​​firing positions. Taking advantage of impunity, the enemy increased the fire, and our losses grew.

Battalion commander G.E. Nazarov was ordered to immediately open fire on the enemy located no more than 150 m away. The order was sent to the companies, but the soldiers still did not fire. Having given the task to the commanders of the artillery and mortar battalions to prepare fire on the front line of the enemy, I went to the battalion to personally find out why the fire weapons of the rifle subunits were silent. We had to reach the firing line under the continuous whistle of bullets. Individual fighters, physically less enduring, lay listlessly in the snow in cells unprepared for firing. The bulk of the fighters conscientiously worked with shovels, buried themselves well in the snow and were ready to fire. When asked why they did not fire, the fighters and commanders answered:

We don't see targets.

But the enemy does not see us, but shoots and inflicts losses, - I answered the fighters.

The answers of the soldiers and officers were not random. The brigade was formed from the staff, who, in the process of study, were constantly inspired by the requirements of the charters on the careful consumption of ammunition. Article 16 of the 1936 Field Manual stated:

“The saturation of modern combat with artillery and automatic weapons causes an exceptionally high consumption of ammunition. Careful attitude to every projectile, to every cartridge in battle should be an indispensable rule for all commanders and soldiers of the Red Army. Therefore, it is necessary to educate every commander and fighter in the firm knowledge that only well-aimed, organized, disciplined fire will defeat the enemy and, conversely, indiscriminate fire, in addition to the striking consumption of ammunition, is only an expression of one's own anxiety and weakness.

Of course, the requirements of the Field Regulations, correct for their time, could not serve in this situation as a guide for conducting rifle and machine gun fire. Practice has shown that the saturation of troops with automatic weapons makes it possible to conduct massive, intense fire, flooding the enemy with lead rain. Such "random" enemy fire, in addition to moral oppression, brought considerable losses, and we felt it ourselves.

At first during the war, with great difficulty, it was necessary to increase the fire activity of riflemen and machine gunners. Very often the infantry called in the fire of artillery, while they could cope with the enemy with their own means. It is characteristic that in the first battles the brigade used up several ammunition loads of artillery shells and mines and less than half of the ammunition load of cartridges. The corps commander, General H. A. Hagen, insistently demanded in almost every combat order: “Everything and everything must shoot”, explaining that the massive use of automatic fire does not exclude, but, on the contrary, increases the role of single well-aimed aimed shots.

There was no question of any volley fire under these conditions, as was then insistently required in the orders. The incessant rattle of automatic enemy fire and explosive bullets overhead, not to mention the explosions of shells and mines, drowned out all teams. In this incessant roar, it was necessary to crawl up to almost every soldier to give the order to open fire.

No one in the battalion could really say what the enemy's defense was and where his firing points were located. They also did not know whether there was a barrier in front of the front line, whether the defense was equipped with trenches and communications. The enemy's defense could only be judged by his dense fire, saturated with automatic means.

Having no combat experience yet, the commanders of rifle companies, pressed to the ground by the fire of machine guns and machine guns, did not dare to take active reconnaissance actions, and their feeble attempts in this direction brought nothing but losses. Indeed, the enemy's fire was so dense that it seemed impossible even for a small group of fighters to break through.

In addition, the extreme fatigue of the entire personnel greatly affected the activity. It was impossible to delay the attack, but throwing the battalion into battle against the unexplored and unsuppressed German defenses would have been reckless.

The battalion commander, Major G. Nazarov, was wounded, as was his chief of staff. The duties of the battalion commander were taken over by the deputy chief of staff, Lieutenant Ya. I. Saltan, a young, courageous, knowledgeable officer. He and I decided to make a reconnaissance of the front line of the enemy's defense in the direction of attack of one of the companies. It was necessary to establish what constitutes the front line of defense and where the enemy's firing points are located. In addition, it was necessary to establish a method of conducting reconnaissance in the dense thickets of the forest, so that right there, on the basis of personal experience, to give practical instructions to the commanders of rifle companies and batteries. The success of the attack entirely depended on how reliably the enemy at the forefront would be suppressed. We were joined by the head of the political department of the brigade, battalion commissar N. G. Sergienko.

Dividing into two groups and taking two machine gunners with us, Lieutenant Saltan and I crawled into the neutral zone. To the front line, judging by the fire of the Germans, it was no more than 100-150 m. It was difficult to crawl in a dense forest in deep snow. Snow fell into the sleeves, the tops of the boots, and the branches of trees and shrubs clung to clothes and equipment.

Bullets whistled over us all the time and did not allow us to raise our heads. Trying not to find ourselves, we slowly crawled towards the German defenses, but the view did not improve at all. Before my eyes, there was still dense vegetation, interfering with observation. After resting a little, they crawled further. At 40–50 m from us, in the gaps in the forest, we saw a compacted snow embankment as tall as a man. Behind the embankment were the Germans, who continuously fired from machine guns, as if from hoses, without putting them to the shoulder. Machine guns fired in long bursts somewhere nearby, but none of us managed to find them. It was dangerous to stay here longer, and we crawled back.

Our return was overshadowed: a few steps from the battalion chain, the battalion commissar N. G. Sergienko was killed. Two stray bullets also hit my helmet, but, fortunately, the Soviet steel did not let me down. It should be noted that our reconnaissance also had an educational value: after that, the fighters and commanders began to act more boldly and more proactively.

Now, in order to organize reconnaissance of the enemy in the offensive zone of the battalion, and then machine-gun fire at the identified firing points, officers of the battalion and brigade headquarters were sent to each company. It took at least five hours of daylight time to reconnoiter and organize rifle and machine-gun fire. It was not easy, under the whistle of bullets, to teach the fighters and officers the elementary methods of fighting in the forest. On that day, we missed many officers, but as soon as our machine guns, machine guns and rifles began to speak, the enemy’s fire noticeably weakened.

The situation with the artillerymen and mortarmen was no better. The time for artillery readiness to open fire was running out. The commanders of batteries and divisions, having lost time in a long and fruitless search for observation posts, did not prepare for firing and did not know what to do next. And the brigade's artillery chief, Captain K. I. Pontuzenko, and I, who had been in battle more than once, did not have ready-made recipes for artillery operations in continuous thickets of the forest. On the ground, flat as a table, there was not a single hill and not a single tall tree for observation. This put the gunners in a very difficult position. How to conduct artillery and mortar fire when not a single enemy machine gun has been spotted, not a single section of his defense is visible, and no explosions of our shells and mines are observed?

Before giving instructions to the commanders of batteries and mortar companies, we had to solve this problem ourselves. It would be unfair to blame the gunners for not knowing their business, since never before in the pre-war years did anyone have to shoot in such conditions, and no one demanded such shooting.

Having thought together with the chief of artillery of the brigade, captain K. Pontuzenko and with the commanders of divisions, captains T. S. Zaitsev, P. M. Nikolaev and senior lieutenant A. R. Yasenetsky on how to organize the artillery preparation of the attack, we came to a decision: battery commanders and mortar companies to reach the line of attack to the commanders of the supported rifle companies, and make the first shots with the flight of shells over the front line of the German defense, and then, gradually shortening the firing distance, bring the shells and mines to the front edge of the enemy, i.e. to remove 100-150 m from the front line of our infantry. This task was facilitated by the fact that the Germans on that day conducted artillery and mortar fire in the brigade zone in separate raids, and therefore the battery commanders in the pauses between them could hear the explosions of their shells and mines and adjust the fire by ear. Such shooting in the area was not very effective, but under these conditions, with limited time, nothing else could be invented.

It was also difficult with direct fire. Not seeing targets and fearing the defeat of their troops from shell explosions when they hit the trunks and branches of trees and shrubs growing nearby, the gun crews decided that firing under these conditions was impossible. I had to spend a lot of time here too on training calculations and organizing fire, but, again, not on targets, but on the enemy’s snow embankment.

The corps headquarters kept urging us to attack. The whole day was spent on preparing and organizing the battle and, along the way, on training personnel in firing in a wooded and swampy area. Only by eight o'clock in the morning on March 26 were parts of the brigade relatively ready to attack.

The brigade’s battle plan was as follows: after a short artillery preparation, the 1st battalion, supported by all the brigade’s firepower, breaks through the enemy’s defenses and captures the Konduya-Smerdynia road, three kilometers north of Smerdynia. After breaking through the front line, the 2nd battalion is brought into battle, and, building on the initial success, the battalions capture the enemy's stronghold in the Khvoynaya grove. (The 3rd battalion continued to fight with the groups that had broken through in the Malinovka area.)

We had no idea what was being done on the front of the corps offensive. The corps headquarters did not orientate us in the situation, obviously believing that truthful information about the unsuccessful actions of the corps would reduce our confidence in the success of the offensive and thus adversely affect the fulfillment of the task assigned to us. However, we guessed from the lull on the army front that the offensive of the corps and army units was stopped by the organized resistance of the enemy. And indeed, parts of the corps and the army did not conduct active operations that day.

At eight o'clock in the morning on March 26, after 20 minutes of artillery preparation (frankly, very weak), the 1st battalion boldly attacked the enemy and, breaking through its front line, rushed forward. Because of the right flank of the 1st battalion, the 2nd battalion was brought into battle. The enemy hastily retreated, leaving the dead and wounded on the battlefield. The first combat success inspired the fighters. Despite the deep snow and thickets of the forest, the units quickly moved forward. The onslaught was so strong that it seemed that there was no trace of the former fatigue of the fighters. Among the first to saddle the road was the 1st company of the 2nd battalion of Lieutenant V. Ya. Avdeev.

Soon, the German units approached from neighboring defense sectors and managed to take a prepared position in the depths of the forest and meet the battalions with fire from all their means. The battalions lay down. It was necessary to organize the fire of artillery and mortars again. As before, the enemy's defense was not visible.

There is no doubt that the Nazis from the beginning of the rapprochement tirelessly monitored the actions of the brigade, but, busy repelling attacks in other sectors of their defense, could not concentrate the necessary forces and means against the brigade. When the offensive of the army units was repulsed, the Germans' hands were untied. Without much risk, they strengthened the defense in the direction of the brigade's offensive, maneuvering trajectories and pulling up infantry, artillery, 20-mm anti-aircraft guns from neighboring sectors, fell upon the brigade with such hurricane fire that in a few hours of battle the entire forest was turned into chips.

The battalions were in an exceptionally difficult position. Machine guns were fired from the front, machine guns and 20-mm anti-aircraft guns pressed the fighters to the ground. From above, shells and mines rained down in a hail, from the explosions of which there was a continuous rumble.

Nothing prevented the German artillery from thrashing our firing formations: we never saw our aviation, and there was no counter-battery fight. Every minute the losses in the battalions grew. The commander of the 2nd battalion, Lieutenant A.S. Filippov, who replaced the wounded battalion commander, Major K. Kunichev, asked for permission to withdraw the battalion from enemy artillery fire. He did not see that a large strip of terrain was covered by enemy fire. The withdrawal of the battalion in these conditions would have led to even greater losses.

The situation was saved by our gunners, and especially mortars. They were able to quickly concentrate all the fire of their batteries on the enemy infantry. This forced the German infantry to take cover and reduce the fire of machine guns and machine guns.

The fire of the 120-mm mortar division of senior lieutenant A. Yasenetsky suppressed anti-aircraft guns firing direct fire. The commander of the 82-mm mortar battalion, Lieutenant I K. Yakovlev, who had just taken command of the battalion, and the commanders of the mortar companies of this battalion, Lieutenants S. D. Saikin and V. C. Sidorov, acted especially selflessly. Being in infantry combat formations under heavy enemy fire, they conducted intense fire on the German infantry and did not stop it even when two or three people remained in the calculations.

Thanks to the fire of our mortars, rifle subunits were able to get closer to the front line of the enemy's defenses and thereby partially get out from under the most destructive artillery and mortar fire.

Communication between the brigade headquarters and the battalions and artillery was carried out by wire. There were no radio stations in the battalions. Telephone communication with parts of the brigade was repeatedly cut off, but through the efforts and heroism of the signalmen, it was restored again and again without delay. We must pay tribute to the organizational talent of the chief of communications of the brigade, senior lieutenant I.I. From the first hours of the battle, the commander of the communications battalion fell ill, he was replaced by the commissar of the battalion, senior political instructor V.P. Lapchansky, who, together with the adjutant of the communications battalion P.M. had no claims against the signalmen.

The fight did not stop from morning until late evening. The entire forest was mowed down by explosions of shells and mines, only in some places individual fragments of tree trunks stuck out. The Nazis went over to counterattacks several times, which were each time repelled by mortar and infantry fire. Our artillerymen and mortarmen used up to two rounds of shells and mines that day. The battle began to subside only with the onset of darkness. Many units were left without company and platoon commanders. They were replaced by sergeants. The battle formations of companies and battalions were upset. Both battalion commanders, their deputies and chiefs of staff were out of action due to injury. There was no question of continuing the offensive. It was necessary to immediately put the units in order and withdraw all the wounded.

Leaving the outposts in the positions we occupied and instructing the deputy brigade commander, Major G.K. Eroshin, to organize reconnaissance of the enemy, we pulled the battalions several hundred meters to the rear in order to feed the people, put the units in order and give the fighters a chance to rest.

In addition, it was necessary to urgently replenish artillery and mortar units with ammunition. Having given the necessary instructions to the unit commanders, B. Lupolover, the commissar of the brigade, and I went to the command post to report to the corps commander on the results of the battle by telephone. Due to the heavy losses, our mood was depressed. The capture by the brigade of the section of the Konduya-Smerdynia road, which on the front of the corps connected the two largest German defense centers and made it possible for the enemy to maneuver forces and means on the front for more than ten kilometers, although it was of great tactical importance, cost us very dearly.

Under the fresh and heavy impression of the bloody battle, the success achieved was involuntarily associated with a Pyrrhic victory. The most depressing thing was that the baptism of fire, which is of great psychological importance for subsequent battles, brought us significant losses. Preparing for battle, we expected greater results with fewer losses. Conflicting thoughts were running through my head. It seemed that when organizing the battle, somewhere we made a mistake, we didn’t take everything into account, we didn’t do everything to avoid such big losses. Another question immediately arose: why, for the whole day of stubborn, fierce battle, was the brigade left to its own devices and no one helped it in any way? The roar of artillery fire was heard for many kilometers, but neither army nor corps artillery was involved in suppressing enemy fire, especially since the last reserve of the corps, the last fresh forces, rushed into battle.

I reported to the corps commander by telephone that the brigade had completed the immediate task, but the losses were so great that I considered it impossible to continue the offensive until the units were put in order. I waited for the corps commander to attack me with reproaches for the heavy losses, and most importantly, for the report on the need to bring units and subunits in order. It should be noted that during that difficult period of the war it was not customary to report losses during the fighting. Such reports were obviously seen as the desire of subordinates to justify the failure to complete the combat mission, referring to "objective" reasons.

To my surprise, I heard a very warm voice from the corps commander:

The brigade fought very well and showed exceptional perseverance and steadfastness in achieving the goal. You cut the enemy's main road and wedged into one of his strongest strongholds. Unfortunately, we couldn't help you. Put people in order, and tomorrow morning continue to carry out the combat mission.

A conversation with the corps commander encouraged us a little, and the commissar and I went to the battalion to immediately begin preparations for tomorrow's offensive.

It was March 26th. We did not know then that the enemy had succeeded in cutting the communications of the 2nd Shock Army and several formations of the 59th Army in the area of ​​Spasskaya Polist. On that day, and in the following days, the medical staff of the brigade's medical unit and the battalion's first-aid posts had a hard time. Surgeons, mostly women, did not have the opportunity to move away from the operating tables even for a minute, helping the endless stream of the wounded. Doctors who recently graduated from medical schools, having almost no practice, were forced to operate on hundreds of seriously wounded soldiers around the clock without sleep or rest. From prolonged standing at the operating table, many surgeons' feet swelled so badly that they had to wear shoes. large sizes. It was truly selfless work. With deep gratitude I remember the doctors of the medical service: Smirnykh, Baranov, Tikhonova, Genadenko and many, many others.

It is impossible not to remember with great gratitude the medical workers of the battalions, who had to be with the soldiers all the time in the flames of battle, to sacrifice their own lives, saving the wounded. They were very young girls, almost teenagers. Particularly distinguished in the first battle was the 19-year-old military assistant of the 2nd battalion Polina Yasinskaya. From the battlefield, she carried and took out 12 seriously wounded on drags. Being shell-shocked, having lost her hearing and speech, she did not leave the battlefield until all the wounded were taken to the battalion first-aid post. It should be said about many other nurses who, neglecting danger, did everything that the situation demanded. I ask them to forgive me that over the long post-war years their names have been erased from my memory.

All work on the removal of the wounded from the battle, rendering assistance to them in the medical unit and evacuation to the hospital was led by the head of the medical service of the brigade, an energetic and courageous man, doctor Ivan Danilovich Evsyukov. His assistant was a wonderful paramedic, 19-year-old Alexei Dorofeevich Luzan.

By the morning of the next day, our reconnaissance reported that at night the enemy left their positions in front of the front of the brigade and retreated into the depths of the Khvoynaya grove. The battalions put in order during the night, having again taken battle formations, began to move forward. The enemy, leaving part of the forces and several dozen cuckoo snipers in the Khvoynaya grove, occupied the Makarievskaya Hermitage - Smerdynia road with the main forces. On the positions abandoned by the Nazis, shells of shells and cartridges were lying in large heaps, abandoned machine guns and machine guns were lying around. One of the sheds was filled with the corpses of German soldiers, which were apparently prepared for cremation. In one of the burnt barns, the corpses of Soviet prisoners of war were found, according to many signs, burned alive.

Apparently, the enemy retreated in great haste. We captured 12 machine guns and several dozen submachine guns. The road Konduya - Smerdynia cleared of snow by the Nazis became suitable for the movement of all types of transport. The fighters were pleased with the sight of the territory we had just liberated and at the same time aroused even more burning hatred for the enemy. They saw how expensive this fight cost him.

The brigade was now faced with the task of capturing the entire Khvoynaya grove. Fights were going on in the coniferous forest. The Germans skillfully and widely used their snipers: skillfully camouflaged "cuckoos" perched on many spreading trees. Without revealing themselves, they fired explosive bullets and incapacitated everyone who fell into their sights. It was very difficult to conduct command reconnaissance of the enemy defenses. Observation while lying down was hindered by dense bushes, but as soon as one of the officers fell to his feet, he was struck down by a sniper shot. In one of these reconnaissances, a remarkable reconnaissance officer of the brigade, Captain A.N. Kochetkov, was seriously wounded in the head.

Fights were going on for every meter of the forest. The corps stretched out on the front for more than 15 km, and the gaps between the small formations of the corps reached two or more kilometers. The battle formations of the units were rare, elongated chains along the front with many unoccupied gaps.

Despite the excessively wide front and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the formations of the corps daily, after dark, received combat missions for the offensive. Progress was insignificant, and people lost a lot. The enemy, using the gaps between the units, increasingly went over to counterattacks.

Up to 16 German infantry battalions of eight different divisions, up to 15 tanks, 16 armored vehicles, 4 artillery and 5 mortar batteries and up to 12 anti-tank guns operated in front of the corps. The composition of the enemy battalions was different: from 150 to 400 soldiers. In the situation that had arisen, the corps could not continue the offensive with an extended front. Partial losses were significant. There was almost no artillery ammunition, and the personnel were extremely tired. The Germans, to our happiness, were also pretty battered, they did not have the strength for active defense.

Although the enemy launched counterattacks, they were short-lived and indecisive. Using large stocks of artillery ammunition and absolute air supremacy, the Germans systematically carried out fire raids and more and more often bombed the combat formations of our units with dive bombers.

The army command continued to insistently demand decisive action from the corps. On March 28, one regiment of the 3rd Guards Division and the 32nd Brigade organized the defense at the Smerdynia-Didvino line. With the rest of the forces, he regroups to his right flank. The task of the corps is to, in cooperation with the 311th and 11th divisions, which are advancing from the north, the 80th and 281st divisions from the west, encircle and destroy the enemy grouping in the area south-west of Kondui and take Makarievskaya Desert. After repeated attacks, the 80th and 281st divisions captured one of the strong defense centers - Konduya, but failed to advance further. The enemy, maneuvering with infantry and artillery and delivering air strikes, held Makarievskaya Pustyn behind him. The 140th brigade continued to fight in the Khvoynaya grove, but now in the direction of Makaryevskaya Hermitage. On the second day of the battle, units of the brigade seized an ammunition depot, where 18,000 81-mm mines turned out to be.

The young, brave and enterprising commander of the mortar battalion I. K. Yakovlev, right there during the battle, turned to me with a request to allow him to use these German captured mines for firing from our 82-mm mortars. I immediately tasked the brigade's artillery supply service with checking the possibility of using German mines to fire our mortars. The execution of this task was entrusted to the commander of the mortar battalion, Lieutenant I.K. Yakovlev, and the artillery technician of the brigade artillery master military technician of the 2nd rank, V.L. Lupezhov. During the day they fired German mines from our mortars and compiled brief firing tables. The presence of a large number of German mines and the opportunity to conduct aimed fire with them from our mortars made it possible to more confidently solve combat missions. We no longer had our own shells and mines, except for emergency supplies, since their delivery to the positions was very difficult. Now there was something to support the attacks of our infantry, especially since the day before the 3rd battalion returned to the brigade, still relatively full-blooded.

Having a large number of mines and reinforced by the arriving battalion, we immediately, with full confidence in success, set about organizing the battle, with the task of taking possession of the sheds and reaching the Makarievskaya Hermitage - Smerdynia road.

The next day, having carried out a rather impressive preparation for those days for an attack with mortar fire, parts of the brigade went on the offensive. By evening, the western edge of the Khvoynaya grove and the barns were cleared of the enemy. The Nazis lost about two hundred people killed and wounded. Parts of the brigade captured ten machine guns, a large number of machine guns, hand grenades, shells, a radio station and many other trophies. Now the road Makaryevskaya Hermitage - Smerdynia, stubbornly defended by the enemy as a rocade for maneuver along the front, was under rifle and machine-gun fire.

For almost the entire first half of April, parts of the corps fought for the capture of Makaryevskaya Hermitage and Smerdynia, maneuvering between these settlements, but all attacks that were not supported by artillery fire due to the lack of shells were beaten off by the enemy. It was impossible to operate by conventional methods without the support of artillery. It was necessary to change the tactics of enemy attacks, operating in small units on a wide front, now at one point, then at another. Such attacks individually did not give tangible results in terms of advancement, but they pretty much exhausted the enemy and in total caused significant damage to the Nazis in manpower.

The initiators of such actions were the commanders of platoons and companies. Captain A. Kochetkov was the first to set an example. With a platoon of scouts, they infiltrated the front line of the enemy and suddenly attacked the company's observation post of the Germans. Having destroyed up to a platoon of infantry together with the company commander, who did not expect an attack and were not ready to fight back, the scouts held their positions until our company approached.

One day, just before dawn, a platoon under the command of junior political instructor N. Klimov, on its own initiative, broke into the location of the German defense. Having killed part of the garrison of the company stronghold, the platoon captured an artillery gun and, turning it towards the enemy, opened fire on the fleeing fascists. So combat activity in the rifle divisions grew from day to day. What the battalions could not do was done by rifle platoons and squads.

On April 3, the enemy managed to bypass Didvino, which was defended by the 3rd company of the 32nd brigade, and surround it. The personnel of the company, being surrounded until April 13, courageously defended themselves, repulsing enemy attacks with heavy losses for him. Only on April 14 this company was released from the encirclement by units of the 294th Infantry Division. The company arrived in its unit consisting of 43 people with their own and captured weapons.

At the beginning of the second half of April, the enemy began active operations in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Klin grove. He tried to separate parts of the 281st and 198th divisions in order to penetrate in the direction of Malinovka. In order to encircle and eliminate the enemy, the commander of the 54th Army set the corps the task of destroying the enemy grouping in the area of ​​the Klin grove. For the duration of this operation, the 281st and 198th divisions were subordinate to the corps, which were defending on this sector of the army front. In pursuance of the order, the 311th division is transferred in the direction of Lipovik, and the 3rd Guards Division, 140th, 33rd and 32nd brigades are transferred under the Klin grove. On the previous lines they were replaced by the 80th division and other parts of the army.

The front line of the enemy's defense passed along the northwestern edge of the Klin grove, the southern isthmus of this grove to el. 38.2. The enemy had no trenches. They were replaced wooden log cabins from logs with a height of 2 to 5 m with a flooring in the middle. Widely used anti-personnel and anti-tank mines and land mines, installed in front of the front edge. Separate areas were covered with barbed wire. The defense was mainly built on a system of machine-gun fire. All machine guns were installed at the forefront of defense. In total, there were supposedly up to 1,300 soldiers, 15–20 tanks, 20–25 heavy machine guns, 3–4 mortar and 4–5 artillery batteries in the Klin grove. The artillery of the enemy, located in the areas of Vinyagolovo, Makaryevskaya Hermitage, Smerdyn and Ramtsakh, took part in the fire defense system of the Klin grove.

The beginning of the offensive in this area coincided with heavy snowmelt during the day and frost at night. There were melt waters everywhere. In some places, the water level reached 20-50 cm. All the roads nailed in winter disappeared, only in some places there were traces of cart wheels. A dense forest with bushes and deadwood made observation difficult. Exceptional difficulties arose with the delivery of ammunition, food and fodder. Everything had to be delivered by packs and by hand. Every day, and often twice a day, the personnel of the auto company and the rear of the brigade under the command of the energetic commander of the auto company, junior military technician V.G. This team was the only living thread that connected the front with the rear. But it was hardest of all for the people at the forefront. Under enemy fire, occupying all the hills, the soldiers lay in icy water, not drying out day or night, deprived of any opportunity to warm themselves and dry themselves by the fires.

I remembered the poems of the Leningrad poet Alexander Gitovich, who often visited us at that time. He wrote about the soldiers of Volkhov, who knew the hardest military work and found the strength to beat the enemy in hellish conditions:

Look west, look north
Swamp, swamp, swamp...
Who uprooted stumps nights and days,
He knows what work means.
Understand to remember always and everywhere:
How to believe in victory
To work waist-deep in water for a month,
Not complaining even to a neighbor.

The commanders, having no reserves, could not even partially change people in the forward positions. The amazing endurance and heroic fortitude of our troops are admirable.

In mid-April, Lieutenant General Alexander Vasilievich Sukhomlin took command of the 54th Army. He was an educated and well-trained general, who was distinguished by rare calmness and tact. Even in the most acute and difficult situations, restraint and restraint never failed him. In dealing with subordinates, he did not allow himself insulting shouts and demanded the same from the commanders of formations in relation to their subordinate commanders and soldiers. Perhaps this was a man who really enjoyed the sincere respect and love of his subordinate commanders.

On April 20, parts of the corps launched an offensive from the north against the defending enemy in the Klin grove and in some places reached the front line. Further advance, however, was halted by heavy machine-gun and mortar-artillery fire. Stubborn battles for the mastery of the grove "Klin" were fought until May 4th. All attacks by parts of the corps were repulsed by enemy fire with heavy losses for us. Taking advantage of the lull in other sectors of the front, the Germans threw up reserves to the Klin grove.

At the end of April, reinforcements began to arrive in the brigade in small batches, which barely compensated for the losses. The troops did not have shelters, could not dig into the ground because of the swampy soil. Enemy air raids on the headquarters and battle formations of our troops have sharply become more frequent. In one of these raids, the headquarters of our brigade was almost completely disabled. The deputy commander of the brigade, Major G. Yeroshin, the head of the political department of the brigade, battalion commissar N. Chernushchenko, the chief of artillery, captain K. Pontuzenko, the brigade engineer, senior lieutenant K. Zlatokrylets, and others were killed. The chief of staff of the brigade, Major E. Mokshev, was seriously wounded. By some miracle, we survived with the commissar, several soldiers and officers.

Having surrounded the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front, the enemy became more and more impudent, more often went over to attacks, which, as a rule, were preceded by a long concentrated artillery and mortar fire and air raids.

On May 5, parts of the corps, having no success in attacking the Klin grove from the north, began preparing a new version of the operation with the aim of encircling the enemy defending in the grove. By decision of the corps commander, the main blow was delivered by the right flank of the corps in the direction of el. 33.0 and auxiliary - in the direction of the road junction southwest of Dubovik and further south along the road to Lipovik. In practice, this decision was expressed as follows: the 32nd brigade with tanks of the 98th and 16th tank brigades (five tanks in total) struck along the northern bank of the Polyansky stream in the direction of el. 33.0 with the task to reach the western bank of the Chagoda River.

The 33rd Brigade attacked the northwestern corner of the Klin Grove. The 3rd Guards Rifle Division struck with the left flank with the task of capturing the junction of roads southwest of Dubovik. The 140th brigade, being in the second echelon of the corps, had to be ready to build on the success of the offensive of the 32nd brigade.

The offensive that began on May 8 did not bring significant changes. The 32nd brigade, having met stubborn resistance from the enemy, could not move forward, as a result of which, on May 9, the 140th brigade was brought into battle, five tanks were reassigned to it and the task was set to capture the eastern bank of the Chagoda River. Having deployed at the junction of the 1069th Infantry Regiment of the 311th Division and the 32nd Brigade, the 140th Brigade, despite the extremely difficult terrain and stubborn enemy resistance, crosses the Chagoda River, cuts the Lipovik-Dubovik road and thereby creates a threat of encirclement of the enemy in the grove "Klin". At the same time, the 32nd brigade, turning the front to the north, takes possession of the northern edge of the nameless grove. The Germans, deprived of the only way of supply, from this day on are forced to feed their garrison from the air.

In this battle, units of the 140th brigade captured: six cannons of various calibers, two mortars, one heavy machine gun, forty horses, thirty-five wagons, an ammunition depot and other trophies. For successful actions in difficult conditions of the situation, the corps command announced gratitude to all the personnel of the brigade. This gratitude was well deserved by the fighters and officers of the brigade. Successful actions were the result of a lot of preliminary work by the entire command staff in organizing the battle and the courageous, selfless actions of the fighters and junior commanders.

In order to complete the encirclement of the enemy, it was necessary to strengthen the right flank of the corps. To this end, on the night of May 13, due to the expansion of the front of the 33rd brigade and the 13th rifle regiment, the 5th and 9th rifle regiments of the 3rd division are withdrawn from the area west of Dubovik and concentrated to the right of the 32nd brigade. Their task was to advance in the direction of the road junction one kilometer southwest of Dubovik.

Offering resistance to our units surrounding them, the Germans were preparing a strike from the south and from the Klin grove in order to surround the units that had broken through to the Chagoda River, and then, according to the testimony of the prisoners, they planned to restore the defense line by rail with a strike to the north. The attack was prepared by a three-day aviation and artillery preparation against the troops of the 4th Guards Corps.

Throughout the night of May 14, the Germans were shelling the command post of the 140th brigade and the surrounding areas. At dawn, with a sudden blow, they broke through the front of the 281st division and, with forces up to an infantry regiment with three tanks, attacked the command post of the brigade, which had no more than 30 soldiers and officers.

The situation became so serious that one of the staff officers offered to destroy all the secret documentation of the brigade headquarters so that it would not fall into the hands of the enemy. This proposal was rejected.

The Nazis walked in a thick chain, half-drunk (for courage), scribbling on the move from machine guns. Seeing German tanks and a large mass of infantry, individual fighters shouting “Fascists!” started firing back. Hearing machine-gun rattle and the noise of tank engines, Brigade Commissar B. Lupolover and I grabbed our machine guns and ran towards the retreating fighters. It was important to stop the enemy at all costs: his exit to the rear of the corps and army units threatened with grave consequences. We had to fight to the last.

Get down, fire! I gave the command.

Seeing and hearing us running towards the Germans with machine guns in their hands, the fighters quickly turned into a chain, lay down and started shooting. Having met return fire, the Nazis lay down, conducting, as always, intense fire from machine guns, machine guns and mortars. Their tanks continued to slowly move forward. A squad of scouts with bundles of grenades and bottles of combustible mixture jumped out to meet the tanks and took up positions behind the trees. Not far from the scouts was one of the tanks of the 98th brigade with a faulty undercarriage. Soon the enemy tanks were finished: one of them was set on fire by our scouts, and the other two were hit by a faulty tank.

The Nazis rose several times and rushed to the attack, but, losing people, lay down again. The assistant to the chief of staff of the brigade, young lieutenant V. Ya. Avdeev, who had just arrived from the hospital after being wounded, on his own initiative went to the command post of the 3rd Guards Division to General Martynchuk and brought the soldiers of the commandant's platoon of the division. Now we feel more energized. The arriving platoon had a light machine gun, and it was in the hands of a master of his craft. The machine gunner fired confidently, in even bursts, without a single delay. His well-aimed shooting mowed down and pressed the enemy to the ground. At this moment of an unequal battle, the chased shot of our machine gun, as if musical instrument in the hands of a virtuoso, brought real pleasure.

The commissar, the reconnaissance sergeant and two fighters and I found ourselves in the center of the chain and, together with everyone, fired at the enemy. The brigade commissar was slightly wounded, but he, overcoming pain, remained with us. A reconnaissance sergeant was wounded in the chest, who also refused to go to the rear and, spitting blood, loaded the disks of our machine guns. Raising the chain of fighters to attack, I was wounded by two bullets. In the heat of battle, there was no particular pain, and I continued to fire and command a group of fighters and officers. Last time we met with the Germans at the distance of a grenade throw. Our fighters fought with amazing courage. None of the wounded left the battlefield. For about two hours there was a very stubborn battle. Unable to withstand our onslaught, the Germans began to hastily retreat, leaving the dead and wounded. Looking at the fleeing Germans, I rejoiced at the successful outcome of the battle, in which the enemy had a tenfold superiority in strength. At that moment, I remembered one very true saying, born from the experience of many years of combat practice: “In war, you cannot despair of success until the last minute.” Indeed, the slightest sign of insecurity or weakness could lead to disastrous results.

From a large loss of blood, I began to lose consciousness. The next day, while in the medical unit of the brigade, I received a very warm letter from the corps commander, General H. A. Hagen, in which he, in particular, wrote: “They beat the Fritz great, they did not expect.” And in the postscript of the corps commissar, Colonel A. Lopatenko, it was said: “Your brigade is fighting heroically.”

The enemy attack on the command post of the 140th brigade was carried out simultaneously with the attack on the 5th and 9th regiments of the 3rd Guards Division, which by this time had reached the southern edge of the Klin grove, as well as on units of the 311th Infantry Division from the area Dubovik with up to 300 people. The enemy counterattack was repulsed, but scattered groups of Germans seeped into the rear, attacked single soldiers, disrupted communications, trying to disorganize command and control.

“On May 17, in order to intensify the strike in the northern direction and comb the forest in the rear of the corps’ battle order, by order of the commander of the 54th Army, the 311th rifle division is brought into action with its subordination to the commander of the 4th corps. As a result of the actions of the 3rd Guards and 311th divisions, our units captured the southern edge of the Klin grove and reached the bank of the Chernovskaya stream. Parts of the corps went on the defensive, and then began to be withdrawn to the army reserve for staffing. This ended the Luban operation of the 54th army.

“The troops of the 54th Army, in cooperation with the troops of the Volkhov Front, fought in extremely difficult terrain and the situation as a whole. This struggle demanded high moral qualities, courage and great physical exertion from them. And, despite all the difficulties, the army managed to break through the enemy defenses and advance to a depth of 25 km, putting the enemy in a critical position. And there is no doubt that only as a result of shortcomings in the organization of the offensive, made by the command of the Volkhov Front and the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, did a large enemy group defending the Kirishi-Chudovo-Lyuban region escape encirclement and destruction.

So, the heavy fighting near Lyuban ended. Formations of the 54th Army went over to the defensive at the lines reached. At the end of May, the 311th Rifle Division, having made a 65-km march on the orders of the army command and replacing units of the 44th division, took up defense at the turn: the southeastern shore of the Sokolii Mokh swamp - the bank of the Volkhov River, 2 km north of New Kirishi. On the right, the 115th Rifle Division was defending, and on the left, across the Volkhov River, the 310th Rifle Division of the 4th Army. In the second echelon behind the left flank of the 311th division, the 140th separate rifle brigade took up defense.

Both the division and the brigade immediately began to strengthen the defensive line, sanitized personnel, repaired weapons, equipment, uniforms and shoes. The enemy, broken by long battles, behaved quietly.

Our brigade was often visited by the corps commander Nikolai Alexandrovich Gagen and stayed with us for a long time, helping to organize combat training. He paid special attention to the running-in tanks of the fighters sitting in the trench.

Here I would like to go back and dwell on our relationship with the corps commander, to tell a little about him.

When in March the brigade arrived from Siberia to the region of the city of Volkhov, the commissar of the brigade B. M. Lupolover and I came to H. A. Hagen with a report. He asked us in detail about the combat capability of the brigade. Several times he himself visited the units in classes and exercises in order to personally verify the correctness of the information. The checks passed without significant remarks.

In the beginning, as it seemed to me, he treated me with a fair amount of hostility and distrust. I explained this by the fact that Hagen was worried about the question of whether I could cope with the brigade, having not yet had experience of participating in hostilities in this war. When the formations of the corps made a march to the front line through impassability and deep snow, General Hagen, controlling the movement of parts of the corps every night, fell on me several times, dissatisfied with the fact that parts of the brigade were stretched out on the march. In order to camouflage from enemy reconnaissance from the air, the formations of the corps moved only at night and before dawn had to have time to reach the area of ​​the daytime halt in the dense forest. The brigade, with difficulty, but still managed to concentrate in the area indicated to us. Fearing that the units of the brigade would not have time to reach the appointed area of ​​​​the day's halt after dark, General Hagen, warmed up by an officer of the General Staff, Colonel Vasilyev, a quarrelsome person by nature, was nervous and more and more often allowed shouting and insults addressed to me. For 20 years of service in the army, I have not had a single remark and I am not used to such treatment. And Hagen himself was by nature not a rude person. Once, at the command post of the commander, I reported to the corps commander about the state of the brigade and the exit to the daylight area assigned to me. At the same time, Colonel Vasiliev was present, who everywhere, like a shadow, accompanied General Hagen. For some trifling reason, Hagen attacked me with rude abuse, without restraint in expressions. This time I could not stand it and sharply replied that the senior boss has the right to punish and bring his subordinates to justice for wrongdoing, but no one has the right to insult a person, especially when there is no reason for this. Brigade commissar B. Lupolover supported me.

After this incident, we never once heard from Hagen not only rudeness, but even an elevated tone. In all likelihood, the general realized that before him were officers who knew how to stand up for themselves.

When it was necessary to report on the accomplishment of a combat mission or on the situation that had developed during the battle, I most often called the chief of staff of the corps, Colonel Kudryavtsev, who was always calm and tactful, to the phone and reported to him. General Hagen visited the brigade several times during the fighting, although it was not easy to get to us through the swamps and under enemy fire. I was impressed by his courage, exactingness to himself and his subordinates, and a sense of great responsibility for the assigned work.

I remember when units of the brigade broke ahead of other parts of the corps and, having crossed the Tigoda River in the Lipovik-Dubovik sector, defeated the enemy battalion and intercepted the only enemy road in this sector, I reported this to Colonel Kudryavtsev. A few minutes later Hagen called me to the phone and, after listening to my report, asked why I did not immediately report to him personally.

Understand, - said Hagen, - it’s not enough for me just to know what is happening in the offensive zone of the brigade, I still want to hear your voice.

This was said with great warmth. The corps commander thanked us for our service and ordered that gratitude be declared on his behalf to all the personnel of the brigade. He mentioned several times Major Nazarov, who was the first to cross the Tigoda River with a battalion.

After that, there was no trace of the former tension. In the future, our relations were built only on great mutual respect and trust. After my injury, while in the medical unit of the brigade, I received a letter from General Hagen. I quote it here in full:

“Dear Boris Alexandrovich!

Everything is fine in your business. Nazarov (battalion commander, who returned after being wounded to the brigade and crossed the Tigoda River with the battalion) on the spot. It is quiet in the KP area, all measures have been taken, they are being fixed. They beat the Fritz great, they did not expect. In the immediate vicinity of the command post about 60 killed, 3 captured. 7 radios, 6 machine guns, 1 mortar, several dozen rifles were taken. Two tanks were knocked out, one burned down. The collection of weapons continues. According to the documents, a sabotage gang operated: 1, 2, 3 companies of 162 PP, 6 and 5 companies of 45 PP, 4 company of 185 PP and 9 artillery battery of 21 AP.

Once again, I wish you good health and a speedy recovery. If you need anything, feel free to let me know, I'll be happy to help you. I shake your hand. Greetings with best wishes to Davydov and Voronin (this is the commander of the tank battalion and his chief of staff, who were wounded at the same time as me). Respectfully yours, Hagen N.

At the end of the letter there was a postscript of the corps commissar, Colonel A. Lopatenko:

“Good afternoon, comrade Vladimirov!

I sincerely regret that you were injured. With all my heart I wish you a speedy recovery and return to us. We will wait for you in the same way as for comrades Davydov and Voronin, rather get in line. Feel free to write to us if you need help. We will help. Your brigade is fighting heroically. A. Lopatenko.

The day after I received this letter, Hagen himself came to the medical battalion on horseback, covered in mud, to visit me. He brought me two bottles of captured French cognac as a gift. I was surprised and touched by the attention paid to me in such a difficult, hot time.

When visiting our brigade, General Hagen liked to talk about his past, about his service in the tsarist army, and he was always listened to with interest. During the imperialist war, H. A. Hagen, with the rank of officer, fought on the Russian-German front, where he was poisoned with asphyxiating gases. The consequences of this were felt even now: he often coughed heavily and with anguish. Having gone through the entire Civil War, peaceful studies, Nikolai Aleksandrovich took part in the battles from the first days of the Great Patriotic War, commanding a rifle division, which was renamed the “Guards” division for success in combat operations. Then he was appointed commander of the 4th Guards Corps, which included his former 3rd Guards Rifle Division.

Many of the personnel of the brigade were presented for awards for their skill and heroism during the Luban operation. Award lists were sent by command to the headquarters of the Volkhov Front (now we were part of this front) and soon returned from there with the commander's resolution: "The army was not successful, refuse the award." Although no one in the brigade thought about awards and did not expect them, such an indiscriminate attitude towards all fighters and commanders without exception was fundamentally wrong. The army really did not fully fulfill the task assigned to it, but many commanders and soldiers fought without sparing their lives and died heroically. They, at least posthumously, should have been awarded.

In July and August, reinforcements and missing weapons arrived in the brigade. Along with defensive and road work, combat training was intensively carried out on our sector with command personnel and subunits.

In order to check the progress of defensive work and organize training, the brigade was visited by the commander of the 54th Army, General A. V. Sukhomlin, who was distinguished by rare endurance and self-control. Being, in fact, an educated, intelligent person, he never allowed himself to be rude in dealing with subordinates of any rank, even in the hardest days of the war, when everyone's nerves were strained to the limit. I admired this character trait of the commander, and I wanted to know how he achieved this: either he was endowed with this wonderful quality by nature, or he went through a good school in his youth. The difficulties of life did not seem to affect him in any way: always neat, fit, slender - a great example to follow.

But, alas, there were other commanders who, under the influence of the front-line situation, quickly lost what they had gained over the long years of peaceful pre-war years. The profanity was very contagious. They cursed everywhere and always, and most often just like that, to “decorate speech”. But no one has ever heard anything like this from General Sukhomlin. At meetings of the commanding staff, he demanded, was indignant, asked to throw swearing out of his lexicons. Everyone agreed with him, but behind the door of the dugout everything returned to normal.

Notes:

MO archive, f. 4th Guards sk., op. 7987, d. 5, ll. 13–14.

MO archive, f. 4th Guards sk., op. 7987, d. 5, l. 15.

MO archive, f. 4th Guards sk., op. 7986, d. 19, l. 21.

MO archive, f. 4 sq. sk., op. 7987, d. 19, ll. 23–24.

MO archive, f. 4th Guards sk., op. 7987, d. 19, l. 26.

MO archive, f. 4th Guards sk., op. 7987, d. 19, l. 28.

MO archive, f. 4th Guards sk., op. 7987, d. 19, l. 36–37.

MO archive, f. 4th Guards sk., op. 7987, d. 19, l. 40.

MO archive, f. 4th Guards sk., op. 7987, d. 19, l. 40–41.

MO archive, f. 4th Guards sk., op. 7987, d. 19, l. 42.

History of the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945 T. 2. S. 336.

"MM. AGAPOV, retired colonel, participant in the Luban operation LUBA OPERATION (01/07/1942 - 07/10/1942) (The course of hostilities and the courage of soldiers) ... "

-- [ Page 1 ] --

History of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)

MM. AGAPOV,

retired colonel,

participant in the Luban operation

LUBA OPERATION

(7.01.1942 – 10.07.1942)

(The course of hostilities and the courage of warriors)

Part one

OFFENSIVE

(7.01.1942 – 30.04.1942)

"... Luban offensive

operation is one of

insufficiently researched

military-historical science.

("Military-historical

magazine", No. 5, 1999) Moscow Table of contents FROM THE AUTHOR

PART I. OFFENSIVE OPERATION (01/07/1942 - 04/30/1942)

CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND OF THE OPERATION

CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER 4. THE BEGINNING OF THE OPERATION ON THE VOLKHOV

FRONTS

§4.1. FIRST ATTACK ATTEMPT

§4.2. RE-OFFENSIVE

§4.3. COMBAT OPERATION TO ENROUND THE MGINSKO-LADOGA GROUP

GERMAN TROOPS

Fighting on the site of the 4th Army of the Volkhov Front

Fighting on the site of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front

CHAPTER 6. FURTHER COMBAT ACTIONS ON THE SITE OF THE 4TH ARMY.

CHAPTER 7. CONTINUATION OF COMBAT ACTIONS ON THE MAIN DIRECTION52

CHAPTER 8. ARRIVAL OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE STATE K.E. VOROSHILOV

CHAPTER 9. OFFENSIVE ON LYUBAN

CHAPTER 10

CHAPTER 11

CHAPTER 12

BET SOLUTIONS

§12.1. COMBAT ACTIONS OF THE 4TH ARMY OF THE VOLKHOV FRONT

§12.2. COMBAT ACTIONS OF THE 54TH ARMY OF THE LENFRONT

CHAPTER 13. CONTINUATION OF COMBAT ACTIONS ON THE MAIN DIRECTION.

§13.1. REFLECTION OF THE GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN THE "CORRIDOR" OF THE BREAKTHROUGH

§13.2. BATTLE AFTER REFLECTION OF THE GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE

§13.3. VLASOV

CHAPTER 14

LENINGRAD FRONT

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX №1. DIRECTIVES OF THE SECURITY COMMAND TO VOLKHOVSKY AND

TO LENINGRAD FRONTS

From the Author World War II has long been part of history. There are fewer and fewer veterans of the Great Patriotic War, direct participants in that war. You can rarely see them on the streets of Russian cities.

More often there are young people with medal bars for other wars:

Afghan, Chechen New time. New people. New Veterans.

The defense of Leningrad is now remembered only on significant dates: the breakthrough of the blockade, the complete lifting of the blockade, Victory Day.

The battle for Leningrad, which lasted 1125 days, occupies one of the most heroic and tragic pages not only in the history of the Great Patriotic War and World War II, but also in the entire world history.

The enemy expected to capture Leningrad two weeks after the attack on the USSR. But the steadfastness and courage of the soldiers of the Red Army and the People's Militia thwarted the German plans. Instead of the planned two weeks, the enemy fought his way to Leningrad for 80 days. Mankind knows no other such example, when a huge city for almost 900 days was in the ring of an enemy blockade and not only lived, but also courageously fought against the enemy.

The battle for Leningrad is a set of defensive and offensive operations carried out by Soviet troops in the north-west of the country from July 10, 1941 to August 9, 1944.

These operations were carried out in order to defend Leningrad, defeat the German Army Group North and the Finnish troops between the Onega and Ladoga lakes and on the Karelian Isthmus. Among them is the Luban operation (01/07/1942 - 07/10/1942). It is divided into three operations (stages) - an offensive, defensive operation and an operation to withdraw the 2nd shock army from the encirclement.

Despite its great strategic importance, the Luban operation has been relatively little studied. There is a fairly significant number of memoirs of its participants. Some historical articles are dedicated to her, in which certain issues related to the operation are considered. However, there are no works that combine these individual issues into a holistic view that allows us to reveal with the greatest completeness the goals of the operation, its features and main results. This is noted, for example, in the Military Historical Journal, No. 5, 1999.

The author of this work collected and systematized the materials available to him on the Luban operation: a significant number of archival documents of the TsAMO RF (300 titles); works by B.I. Gavrilov Valley of Death. The Tragedy and Feat of the 2nd Shock Army” and “Through the Valley of Death”;

the work of K.K. Krupitsa “Fighting of the 2nd shock army in the Luban offensive operation”, memoirs of Ya.A. Kurochkin “We fought on the North-Western Front”, articles published in the “Military History Journal”, materials of the Museum of the Volkhov and Leningrad Fronts in Moscow, in particular, the memoirs of N.I. Klykov and P. Egorov, as well as memoirs of other participants in the operation, published in various collections.

The author described not only the actions of the 2nd shock and 59th armies in the area of ​​Myasny Bor, Lyuban, but also the actions of other armies of the North-Western, Volkhov and Leningrad fronts during the offensive part of the Lyuban operation. The author sought to reveal the difficulties that the participants in the operation had to face, from the commander of the front to the ordinary Red Army soldier. The presentation is accompanied by examples of true heroism and self-sacrifice of Soviet soldiers, without which the Great Victory was impossible. All examples given are documented facts.

The first part of the work presented here covers only the offensive operation. The second part of the work will be devoted to the defensive operation and the operation to withdraw the 2nd shock army from the encirclement.

The work contains necessary schemes and maps illustrating the course of hostilities, photographs and indexes of materials used.

–  –  –

CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND OF THE OPERATION

The northwestern strategic direction was one of the main directions in Hitler's plans in the war against the USSR. The German fascist command took into account its importance in terms of "Barbarossa".

While planning the main attack in the western direction towards Moscow, it paid serious attention to actions in the northwestern sector as well, i.e. towards Leningrad. The capture of the cradle of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the city of Lenin, in the opinion of the Nazi leaders, could be a major military-political defeat of the USSR.

Hitler claimed that with the capture of Leningrad, one of the symbols of the revolution would be destroyed. The fascist command also believed that successful operations in the Leningrad direction would not only ensure the safety of the left wing of Army Group Center, but also make it possible to make a roundabout maneuver to attack Moscow from the north.

The heroism and steadfastness of the soldiers of the Red Army and the People's Militia did not allow the city to be taken by storm on the move. Important evidence of the resilience of the Soviet troops in the northwestern direction was given by Tippelskirch in his “History of the Second World War”: “The enemy troops under the command of Marshal Voroshilov from the very beginning had a deeply echeloned location ... Obviously, the enemy was aware of the large concentration of German formations in East Prussia ... The destruction of large enemy forces, as planned, was not carried out ... The stubbornness of the enemy was convincing, the number of tanks participating in his counterattacks was striking. It was an enemy with a steel will, who ruthlessly, but not without knowledge of operational art, threw his troops into battle. The defense of Soviet Estonia and its capital, Tallinn, which was the main base of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, then Narva and the positions of the Luga defensive region, the Kingisepp fortified area, holding the Oranienbaum bridgehead, delayed the German troops for more than two months on their way to Leningrad.

The capture of Moscow by the political leadership of Germany was made dependent on events in the north-western direction. While in Army Group Center, Hitler emphasized on August 4, 1941 that the first goal was the capture of Leningrad, and that it could be achieved by the troops of Army Group North by August 20, after which all aviation forces located there and a significant part of troops of the Army Group "North" will be placed at the disposal of the Army Group "Center" for an attack on Moscow. The directive of Hitler's headquarters of August 15 indicated that only after the success of Army Group North "... it will be possible to think about resuming the offensive against Moscow" ("On the Volkhov Front", 1982, p. 10).

On August 25, 1941, having concentrated 9 (nine) divisions of the 4th Panzer Group in the Chudovo region, the Germans resumed their attack on Leningrad. The weakened troops of our 48th Army, operating in this area, could not withstand the enemy's blows and began to retreat part of the forces to Kirishi, and part of the forces to Pushkino. The direction to Tosno and Mgu turned out to be open. On August 29, the Germans reached Kolpino, where they were stopped by the 55th Army. On September 8, enemy troops, breaking through the Mga, reached Lake Ladoga and captured Shlisselburg. Thus, Leningrad was blocked from land.

At the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the command of the Leningrad Front was preparing an offensive operation in the Sinyavino direction in the second half of October.

Our troops were to strike with the forces of the 54th Army from the east, and the Neva Operational Group - from the west in order to encircle and destroy the Schlisselburg-Sinyavino group of Germans.

In the midst of the preparations for the operation on October 16, the enemy, with the forces of 8 (eight) divisions of the 39th motorized and 1st army corps, crossed the Volkhov River and went on the offensive in the Tikhvin direction. At the same time, part of the enemy launched an offensive against Malaya Vishera. Having one and a half superiority in people and more than double in tanks and artillery, on October 20 he broke through the defenses of our 52nd Army, and on October 23 captured Budogoshch and went to the rear of our 4th Army, forcing it to withdraw.

On November 8, 1941, the Germans captured Tikhvin. The fascist German command intended to encircle and destroy the troops of the 54th Army by reaching Lake Ladoga in the area of ​​Novaya Ladoga, and to link up with the Finnish troops on the river. Svir and strangle Leningrad and the Baltic Fleet with a second blockade ring. In the future, the enemy intended to advance on Vologda and Yaroslavl, with the aim of forming a new front north of Moscow (bypassing Moscow from the north).

Under these conditions, the Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme Command, despite the most difficult battles near Moscow, considered it necessary to strengthen the reserves of the 4th, 52nd and 54th armies, which were defending in the Tikhvin direction. Our armies went on the counteroffensive. On November 12, the 52nd Army began its operations, on November 19, the 4th Army, and on December 3, the 54th Army. The Tikhvin offensive operation began. On November 20, Malaya Vishera was liberated, and on December 9, Tikhvin. The victory at Tikhvin was one of the first successes of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command in order to combine the efforts of the armies operating east of the river. Volkhov and again concentrated in this area, on December 11, 1941, it decided to form the Volkhov Front by December 17.

Continuing the offensive, by December 27, the troops of the Volkhov Front reached Volkhov in the Kirishi, Novgorod sector, that is, they threw the enemy back to the same line from which he launched the offensive on October 16, and captured bridgeheads on the left bank of the Volkhov in the Lezno, Khmelishchi, north of Gruzino .

CHAPTER 2

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, having assessed the situation at the front and the internal situation of the country by the beginning of 1942, as well as the deterioration of the military situation in Leningrad, the ring of blockade that closed around it and the famine of the city's population that had already begun in December 1941, made a decision and outlined a large-scale operation. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command set a big task for the troops (see.

book "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union". - M., 1961.

v.2, p.302) to defeat the main forces (16th and 18th German armies) of Army Group North

with the aim of breaking the blockade of Leningrad and liberating the entire territory of the Leningrad region south of Leningrad from the enemy (including the cities of Novgorod and Staraya Russa). This was, in essence, the plan of a new strategic operation in the entire northwestern direction. At the same time, unsuccessful attempts to break through the blockade of the city by the troops of one or two armies of the Leningrad Front were taken into account.

Therefore, the operation, which later received the name Lyubanskaya, was not developed as another front-line operation against a very strong enemy. Analyzing this operation, it must be borne in mind that the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of our troops prepared it during the Tikhvin offensive of our troops (Tikhvin strategic offensive operation 19.11 - 30.12.1941) and in initial period Moscow counteroffensive of the Western and Kalinin fronts.

Here it is appropriate to recall the concept of "strategic offensive operation". During the Great Patriotic War, the front usually performed an OPERATIONAL task. To solve strategic tasks, operations were carried out by groups of fronts. (“Military Encyclopedic Dictionary”. - M., 1983., p. 787-788). "STRATEGIC OPERATION" - a set of coordinated and interconnected in terms of purpose, tasks, place and time of operations, strikes, military operations of formations and formations of various types of armed forces, carried out according to a single plan and plan to achieve STRATEGIC goals ... During the Great Patriotic War, a new form of strategic actions was developed - the operation of a group of fronts, which included several simultaneously conducted front-line operations, united by a single plan and leadership of the Supreme High Command. The preparation of a strategic operation is carried out by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the General Staff, commanders and headquarters of the fronts. (“Military Encyclopedic Dictionary”. - M., 1983, p. 710).

According to the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, three fronts were to take part in the operation: Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western. To create the possibility of carrying out this operation in the northwestern direction, the preponderance of the forces of the Red Army over the forces of the Germans in people - 1.5 times, in guns and mortars - 1.6 times, in aircraft - 1.3 times, in tanks

- 1.7 times. This operation was developed during the Tikhvin battles and already on December 11, 1941. At the meeting at Headquarters, where a decision was made to form the Volkhov Front, the corresponding tasks were set, including for the newly formed front. The tasks of the fronts were confirmed by the operational directives of the Headquarters of December 17, 1941.

for the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts and from December 18, 1941 for the North-Western Front.

Commander Volkhov - Commander Leningrad - Commander of the Severosky Front of the Western Front General K. Meretskov General M. Khozin General Y. Kurochkin At the same time, the Volkhov Front was assigned the main role in the defeat of the German Army Group North and the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad.

Therefore, the Headquarters transferred to him from the reserve two newly formed armies in the depths of the country: the 59th army, which consisted of eight rifle divisions and the 2nd shock army, which consisted of one rifle division and seven rifle brigades. Considering that a rifle brigade is not much larger than a good rifle regiment in terms of strength, then the entire army, in fact, was equal to a rifle corps.

Initially, this operation was conceived as a continuation (without a pause) by the Volkhov Front of the Tikhvin offensive operation. His troops (4th, 59th, 2nd shock and 52nd armies) were to go on a general offensive in order to defeat the enemy, who was defending on the western bank of the river. Volkhov north of Novgorod. The main forces to reach the line of Art. Luban - st. Cholovo. Later, advancing in a northwestern direction, the troops of the Volkhov Front, in cooperation with the troops of the Leningrad Front, were to encircle, capture or destroy the Lubansko-Chudovskaya group of German troops. The troops of the Leningrad Front were ordered "by active actions of the 42nd, 55th, 8th, 54th armies and the Primorsky Operational Group to assist the Volkhov Front in defeating the enemy defending near Leningrad and in liberating Leningrad from the blockade."

Let us consider the question of what inter-frontal operations were envisaged to fulfill the task set by the Headquarters?

54th Army (with ten rifle divisions: 128, 294, 286, 285, 311, 80, 115, 281, 198th Rifle Division and 3rd Guards Rifle Division, 6th Naval Brigade and 21st Tank. div.), remaining part of the Leningrad Front, was supposed, in cooperation with the 4th Army of the Volkhov Front, to surround and destroy the enemy, who had advanced north of Mga to Lake Ladoga and blockaded Leningrad from the east and southeast. (This is one inter-front operation of the two fronts of Volkhov and Leningrad).

The troops of the left wing of the Volkhov Front (52nd Army, consisting of seven line divisions, two cavalry divisions and three artillery regiments of the RGK) were to, in cooperation with the armies of the right wing of the North-Western Front, defeat the Novgorod group of German troops, capture Novgorod and in the future offensive in the direction of Soltsy, to contribute to the defeat of the 16th Army of the enemy and to ensure the offensive of the Volkhov Front to the northwest.

The troops of the right wing of the North-Western Front (the 11th Army, consisting of six divisions and three tank battalions), in accordance with the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of 12/18/41, were supposed to strike in the direction of Staraya Russa, Soltsy, Dno to cut the communications of the Novgorod group Germans (Novgorod-Soltsy-Dno) and, in cooperation with the left-flank army of the Volkhov Front (52nd Army), defeat this grouping, thereby contributing to the solution of the main task of wresting Leningrad from the grip of the blockade. The troops of the right wing of the North-Western Front thus contributed to the solution of the main task - to wrest Leningrad from the grip of the blockade. (“History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union”. - M., 1961, vol. 2, p. 302). (In fact, this was supposed to be the second inter-front operation of two fronts - the North-Western and Volkhov). The actions of these armies of the North-Western and Volkhov fronts were supposed to contribute to the solution of the main task of the operation outlined by the Headquarters: to wrest Leningrad from the grip of the blockade.

The defeat of the Novgorod group of German troops, the liberation of Novgorod, reaching Soltsy, Dno (in order to break communications of German troops) and a further turn to Luga would not allow the possibility of transferring additional troops to the breakthrough site to strengthen opposition or deliver a flank strike to the troops of the left wing of the Volkhov Front (2nd shock and 59th armies), performing the main task of deblocking Leningrad. By the same directive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command transferred the Novgorod Operational Group of Troops of the North-Western Front to the 52nd Army of the Volkhov Front.

Tasks for the Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western fronts according to the directives of the Headquarters of the All-Russian Supreme Command of December 17 and 18, 1941 troops of the Volkhov Front to take part in the defeat of the Lyubansko-Chudovskaya enemy grouping. The 8th, 55th, and 42nd armies ... assist the armies of the Volkhov Front in the offensive, surrounded by the enemy. (In fact, this was supposed to be the third operation of two fronts: Leningrad and Volkhov - ed.) The Primorsky Task Force (Lenfront - ed.) Covers the base of the fleet with the defense of the occupied line, and with the release of the armies of the Volkhov Front to the line Krasnoe Selo - Begunitsy goes on the offensive in a southwestern direction with the task of cutting off the enemy's path to Narva ... "

(Khozin M. About one little-known operation. - Military History Journal, 1966, No. 2, pp. 35-36; USSR in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945.

Brief chronicle. – M., 1970, p.141).

As can be seen from the above, according to the directives of the Headquarters, during this operation, at least four inter-front operations were planned and there were other conditions necessary for defining this operation as a strategic one.

Therefore, the statements of some authors that this operation was originally an independent front-line operation do not seem quite correct. In particular, in the "Military History Journal"

(No. 5, 1999) V.V. Gurkin and A.I. Krylov in the article “The Bogey of Myasny Bor. About the Lyuban offensive operation and the withdrawal of the troops of the 2nd shock army from the encirclement in 1942 "indicated:" The Lyuban offensive operation of 1942 was an independent front-line operation.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, in his book The Matter of All Life, wrote about this operation that the troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and right wing of the North-Western Fronts, with the assistance of the Baltic Fleet, were to defeat the main forces of Army Group North and eliminate the blockade of Leningrad (p. 136).

The former commander of the troops of the North-Western Front, General Ya.A. Kurochkin in his memoirs “We fought on the North-Western Front” writes about this period of time, confirming the thesis just expressed: “In front of the troops operating in the north-western and western directions, the Supreme Command put far

running tasks. THE TROOPS OF THE LENINGRAD, VOLKHOV, AND RIGHT WING OF THE NORTH-WESTERN FRONT HAVE TO DESTROY

GERMAN-FASCIST ARMY GROUP "NORTH" AND RELEASE

LENINGRAD. The Kalinin, Western and Bryansk fronts, with the support of the left wing of the North-Western Front, were supposed to surround and destroy the forces of Army Group Center ...

The task fell to the share of the North-Western Front to participate simultaneously in two operations carried out in two STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS - north-western and western, and it was necessary to act in divergent directions "(Kurochkin Ya.A. "We fought on the North-Western Front, Collection, M.: "Nauka", 1969, p.20).

The formulation of the tasks of the North-Western Front according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of December 18, 1941 Kurochkin gives the same as given in this work earlier on page 12 according to the official publication “The USSR in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. A Brief Chronicle, M. Military Publishing House, 1970. He makes only small additions to the right wing of the front.

“The right-flank 11th Army delivered a second frontal blow to Staraya Russa with the immediate task of capturing this city, and later, advancing on the Bottom, Soltsy, in cooperation with the troops of the Volkhov Front, cut off the enemy’s retreat from Novgorod and Luga. In the center of the front, the troops of the 34th Army were to "forge the enemy in the Demyansk direction ..." (Kurochkin Ya.A. "We fought on the North-Western Front, Collection, M .: "Nauka", 1969, p. 21).

Consequently, the right wing of the front had to advance to the west in order to participate in the defeat of the 16th army of the enemy in cooperation with the Volkhov front, and the left wing attacked the 9th army of the enemy from Ostashkov to Rudnya, i.e. to the southwest and south, going deep into the rear of Army Group Center. In both cases, the front acted on the incoming flanks of our main groupings. In both cases, the most difficult tasks had to be solved: in cooperation with other fronts, isolate, cut off from the flank and rear, and defeat large enemy groups aimed at Leningrad and Moscow.

The front obviously did not have the strength to simultaneously solve two such tasks of an operational-strategic scale ...

In the old Russian direction, one weak 11th Army, which suffered losses under the command of General V.I., fought. Morozov, who, obviously, was unable to make a breakthrough to a depth of almost 110 km to the Soltsy south of Ilmen, without the support of the troops advancing on the right and left. (Kurochkin Ya.A. “We fought on the North-Western Front, Collection, M .:“ Nauka ”, 1969, p. 21).

The decision of the commander of the North-Western Front was formulated for the 11th Army as follows: the 11th Army was to “break through the German defenses, capture Staraya Russa, General V.I. Morozov and then advance on Soltsy, Dno, where, having united with the troops of the 52nd Army of the Volkhov Front, destroy the Novgorod grouping of the enemy. In the future, the army was to turn north in the direction of Luga to the rear of the Nazi Army Group North to help break the blockade of Leningrad. The offensive was planned to a depth of up to 110 km with an average daily rate of 7-8 km. Readiness for the offensive - January 5, 1942. (Kurochkin Ya.A. “We fought on the North-Western Front, Collection, M .: “Nauka”, 1969, p. 25; TsAMO RF, f. 221, o. 1366, d. 351, l. 1).

Despite the lack of forces at the front for two strikes, as General Kurochkin wrote about, instead of the task prescribed by the Headquarters, according to its plan for the 34th Army in the center of the front, the task of only defense in order to pin down the enemy in the Demyansk direction, changed this decision. The front command set before it the task of advancing with its flanks and creating conditions for the encirclement of German troops in the Demyansk region. It ordered the 11th and 3rd shock armies to divert part of their forces from the fulfillment of the main tasks assigned to them, arising from the plan of the Headquarters, to assist the 34th army in the Demyansk region.

Kurochkin, in his memoirs, admits that the front command decided to inflict a third blow with the forces of the 34th Army. He writes: “In the center, the 34th Army, according to the plan of the Stavka, was supposed to defend itself in order to pin down the enemy in the Demyansk direction. However, having assessed the situation in detail, we decided to intensify the actions of this army as well ... and create conditions for the encirclement of the Nazi troops in the Demyansk region. After the encirclement and destruction of the Demyansk group, we planned to send the army to the Hill ... The troops of the 34th Army were to be helped by part of the forces of its neighbors - the 11th and 3rd shock armies. The offensive of the 34th Army, according to our plan, was assigned not a decisive, but an auxiliary role.

Instead of the participation of the right wing of the front in breaking the blockade of Leningrad, planned by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the front command put into practice the idea of ​​encircling the enemy's Demyansk grouping in the center of its front. On the pages of his memoirs (p. 26), Y. Kurochkin notes: “This is how the idea of ​​encircling the enemy's Demyansk group came about. But when planning an operation for the environment, we were not able to create even the minimum necessary preponderance of forces, not to mention the fact that we did not have the mobile formations that were so necessary ... ”This is an example of dispersing forces, and not concentrating them to perform the main task.

The 11th Army did not even have enough strength to complete the main task near Staraya Russa and further to Soltsy, Dno with a turn north to Luga to achieve the goal set for the right wing of the front by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command for help in deblocking Leningrad. And the Military Council of the front, by combat order No. 001 of 12.1.42, indicates: “In the center, with the efforts of the 34th Army, with the assistance of the 11th and 3rd shock armies, by 14.1.1942, encircle the Demyansk grouping, prevent its regrouping and departure south of the river line. Paul, Demyansk ... ". Thus, the 11th Army is already being redirected from the direction to the north - Soltsy, Dno, Luga to the south direction. “At the same time, the 11th Army, leaving the enemy garrison blockaded in Staraya Russa, turned south. She went out with her main forces to the Staraya Russa-Pola railway and began to successfully advance towards Ramushev. (Kurochkin Ya.A. “We fought on the North-Western Front, Collection, M .:“ Nauka ”, 1969, p. 30).

Practically, there was no question of rendering assistance to Leningrad. There was a goal more feasible and prestigious.

The operation conceived by the Headquarters turned into a front-line operation at the end of January 1942 due to the unsuccessful actions of the troops of the right wing of the Northwestern Front (11th, 34th armies, and in February the 1st shock army and other formations additionally allocated to the front) and 52 -th Army of the Volkhov Front to fulfill the plan and tasks assigned to them in this operation by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command to defeat the Novgorod group of Germans. A certain share of the Stavka's fault in the lack of control over the implementation of its plans is not excluded here.

The troops of the right wing of the North-Western Front in the old Russian direction, as well as the 52nd Army of the Volkhov Front north of Novgorod, were unable to complete their task, despite the fact that the beginning of the operation of the North-Western Front was successful:

"On January 7, 1942, the Staraya Russian offensive operation of the troops of the North-Western Front began against the 16th field army of the Germans (ended on 20.1.42)." “... Combat operations of the troops of the Volkhov Front resumed ...” and “On January 8, 1942, the troops of the right wing of the North-Western Front, as a result of the successful development of the offensive, having advanced more than 50 km, reached Staraya Russa by the end of the day.” (The USSR in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, a brief chronicle. - M., 1970, p. 155).

Ski units crossed the ice of the lake. Ilmen, bypassed Staraya Russa from the north, cut the road leading from Staraya Russa to Shimsk, and reached the approaches to Shimsk.

Further successful development of operations against the Novgorod group of German troops and operations to block communications used by the Germans to supply and strengthen their Leningrad-Volkhov group did not work. The Headquarters of the Supreme Command, realizing the importance of ensuring the security of the left flank of the armies of the Volkhov Front (2nd shock and 59th armies), fighting to break the blockade of Leningrad, repeatedly sets these tasks before the North-Western Front. To fulfill them, the Headquarters even strengthens this front, and precisely its right wing, transferring troops to it from the Western Front, which was successfully advancing from near Moscow. Among these troops, on the orders of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of 19.1.42, by the end of 21.1.42, the 1st shock army was withdrawn from the battle to the reserve of the Supreme High Command. "As part of the 2nd Guards. SBR, 44, 47, 50, 56, 46 and 41st SBR, 62nd and 84th Marine SBR, 123rd Tank Battalion, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 17, 18, 19, 20 ski battalions, 701st PAP, 1st, 3rd and 38th guards. min. divisions, army directorates with army units in the Zavidovo, Reshetnikovo, Klin, Pokrovka, Vysokovskoye areas. Army Headquarters - Klin.

The headquarters of the High Command orders:

1. By 25.1.42 fully staffed with personnel and horses and weapons according to the state and report card.

All formations and units of the 1st Shock Army withdrawn to the reserve, replenishment of the personnel should be made from units by the best and most trained contingent ...

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command 19.1.42 Stalin, Vasilevsky.

(TsAMO RF, f. 301, o. 6802, d. 6, ll. 178, 179) On January 29, the army received an order to relocate to the Staraya Russa region. There, the 129th and 201st Latvian rifle divisions joined its composition. Additionally, the 1st and 2nd Guards Rifle Corps were transferred to the North-Western Front. At the same time, about the setting by the Headquarters of the task of helping to de-siege Leningrad in the book “The USSR in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. A Brief Chronicle” on page 164 for 19.1.42 states: “The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued a directive that set the main task for the troops of the North-Western Front

- by the actions of the 11th Army in the direction of Soltsy and further to the rear of the Novgorod enemy grouping and the General by the actions of the 1st and 2nd Guards. pages of buildings of the 34th Army V.I. Kuznetsov (commander - Lieutenant General N.E. Berzarin) and the 1st Shock Army (commander - Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov) in the Pskov direction go to the Pskov region, cut off the main communications of the Leningrad-Volkhov enemy group.

This happened after the successful crossing of the Volkhov River and the troops of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front entering its western bank.

True, on January 17, 1942, the commander of the North-Western Front sent a memorandum to the Headquarters outlining his plan to capture Demyansk. To do this, he asked for troops to help the front. And the front received the reinforcements indicated above, but, as Kurochkin himself writes: “The Headquarters ... however, considered the main task of the front not to encircle the Demyansk group, but to strike with significant forces to the west, to the rear of the main forces of Army Group North. Such an intention stemmed from the general state of affairs on the northern sector of the Soviet-German front, and especially from the need to deblockade Leningrad ... According to the Stavka decision, the 1st shock army was concentrated east of Staraya Russa, two rifle divisions and two brigades were sent from the Stavka reserve to the same area ". (Kurochkin Ya.A. “We fought on the North-Western Front, Collection, M .:“ Science ”, 1969, p. 19-20).

Head of the Political Department of the 1st Shock Army, General F.Ya. Lisitsin writes in his book of memoirs that the command of the North-Western Front immediately set the task, together with the 11th Army on February 13, 1942, to break through the enemy’s defenses and defeat the enemy’s old Russian grouping. Further, he writes about the fulfillment of the task, but not the one that was planned by the Headquarters (Staraya Russa, Soltsy, Dno and further to Luga - the author).

“... Already in the first week, the troops of the army made significant progress.

Our frontline neighbors have also achieved some success. As a result, on February 25, the encirclement of seven infantry divisions in the Demyansk area was completed. (Lisitsin F.Ya. In those terrible days, pp. 64, 65).

On the day of the start of this offensive, “on February 13, 1942, offensive operations of the troops of the North-Western Front against the Demyanskaya Front began.

groupings of Nazi troops of the 16th Army (completed on 14.5.42). In the first offensive (completed on March 19, 1942), the troops of the 11th, 1st shock and 34th armies had the task of encircling and destroying the enemy's Demyansk grouping, capturing the cities of Demyansk and Staraya Russa and reaching the line of Art.

Veretyo, Soltsy, Bottom, Dedovichi. Subsequently, strike at Pskov and in the rear of the Novgorod grouping of the enemy. (“The USSR in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. A Brief Chronicle”, p. 177).

The above goals repeatedly set by the Headquarters in the interests of lifting the blockade of Leningrad were never achieved by the armies of the right flank of the North-Western Front and the 52nd Army of the Volkhov Front.

The Novgorod grouping of German troops was not destroyed. The communications of the German Volkhov group of troops were not blocked. This, in particular, contributed to the further buildup of German forces and their infliction of flank attacks on the 2nd shock and 59th armies of the Volkhov Front, breaking through to Lyuban. As a result, a significant part of the troops of the 2nd shock army was surrounded. Unfortunately, most of the work of the researchers of the Luban operation ignores this point. The failure of the Luban operation is considered as a failure only of the Volkhov Front, part of the forces of the Leningrad Front and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which outlined this operation. At the same time, they forget that one of the reasons for the “tragedy of the 2nd shock army” is the unsuccessful actions of the troops of the right wing of the North-Western Front.

Defining tasks for the fronts, the Stavka proceeded from the fact that the overall balance of forces in the northwestern direction, taking into account the replenishment received, was in favor of the Soviet troops, as was already mentioned earlier. Of course, it would be desirable to ensure a greater superiority in equipment and weapons over the enemy and for a longer period of fighting, but ... Our industry from the beginning of the war until the end of 1941 could not yet fully restore the losses of troops in battles and provide for newly formed units . Naturally, there was still a shortage of a significant amount of weapons to reinforce the fronts in the winter offensive of 1941. This also applied to the troops of the North-Western, Volkhov and Leningrad fronts, aiming to defeat the German group of armies "North". The security of the troops of these fronts during the operation is shown in Table 1 below (Military History Journal, 1999, No. 5).

Table 1. The combat and strength of the troops participating in the Lyuban offensive operation on January 7 - April 30, 1942 and in the operation to withdraw the 2nd shock army from the encirclement on May 13 - July 10, 1942 (without the North-Western Front).

–  –  –

Note 1. The table was compiled on the basis of reports on the combat and numerical strength of the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts (TsAMO RF, f.15-a, o.505, dd. 4,14,74-77).

Note 2. In the column “Number of personnel, the numerator shows the total number of troops of the front and armies, the denominator is the number of combat troops and combat support units (reconnaissance, communications, engineering, etc.) Note 3. In the operation from the North-Western Front in January, the 11th Army participated, consisting of the 5th Rifle Division and the 3rd Tank Brigade; in February, the 1st shock army was additionally introduced, consisting of 2 sd, 9 sbr, 11 battalions (tank and ski), 3 divisions of guards mortars (author). It should be noted that in some works, sometimes, it is not entirely correct, according to the author, some other issues related to this operation are also covered.

In particular, it is pointed out that due to the lack of forces and means to organize an offensive in all sectors of the Soviet-German front, it was not necessary to close Leningrad in the winter of 1941-1942.

conduct a strategic operation. It was necessary to confine ourselves to private operations (they had been carried out before and all were unsuccessful). At the same time, they refer to the meeting held at Headquarters on January 5, 1942 to develop a plan for the winter campaign of 1942, at which I.V. Stalin, impressed by the recent victories of the Red Army, insisted on going over to a general strategic offensive. The leadership of the Red Army offered a different option: to concentrate the main efforts in the western direction, where the enemy did not have time to restore the combat capability of his units, to replenish our troops with reserves and equipment here and complete the defeat of the central group of Germans ... In the south and near Leningrad, the enemy managed to create a strong positional defense , to crack it, powerful artillery means are needed ... in these areas it is necessary to limit oneself to private operations ... However, Stalin was carried away by the idea of ​​​​a broad offensive along the entire front, he exaggerated the military significance of the Moscow victory and other counterattacks of the Red Army in the winter of 1941. Point of view Stalin was unconditionally supported by Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. Arguing with Stalin, they say, was useless. Therefore, the meeting adopted the Stalinist plan of operations.

The opinion of the command given here did not take into account the moral side of the issue and the state of besieged Leningrad and its inhabitants. In addition, decisions on this operation and directives to the fronts on its conduct by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were issued long before the above meeting.

A similar point of view about the dangers of this operation is expressed, for example, also in the article by S. Glezerov “Volkhov Cauldron”, published in the newspaper “ TVNZ Petersburg” dated January 11, 2002. This article also uses the false statement of the German historian W. Haupt (S. Glezerov simply claims that the Germans can be trusted) that the Germans were captured as trophies in the battles when the 2nd shock army from the environment, in particular, 171 tanks. However, these data were not verified by the author of the article. In fact, as follows from the data given above in table No. 1 (these data were published in the Military Historical Journal, No. 5 for 1999 on pages 20-21), starting from April 30, 1942 in the 2nd the shock army had only 12 tanks. Even at the height of the operation, their number did not exceed 71 pieces. It is not clear from what fronts the Germans brought to the Volkhov swamps one and a half hundred tanks that did not exist with us there, in order to confirm the statements of V. Haupt. It turns out that the Germans can be trusted, but not all.

It must also be taken into account that the Headquarters, when deciding to continue the offensive, was guided by the fact that the population of Leningrad was dying of starvation and that every day was dear to save them.

It was also taken into account that the Leningrad Front, although it had already carried out several local operations with attempts to break through the blockade, could not resolve this issue on its own.

Leningrad survived the winter of 1941-1942 hard. Communication with the mainland was maintained only along Lake Ladoga. By the time of freezing on the lake, the delivery of food to Leningraders did not exceed one third of its minimum daily consumption. On November 20, the norm for issuing bread was further reduced, the workers began to receive 250 grams of bread per day, the rest - 125 grams. Fuel reserves were depleted, the power plant stopped working, the water supply system froze, and city transport stopped.

Malnutrition has led to a catastrophic increase in mortality.

Ignoring this factor is immoral.

On December 17 and 18, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent directives to three fronts on the strategic operation plan it developed to defeat the 16th and 18th armies of the German Army Group North and liberate Leningrad from the blockade, as well as the cities of Novgorod and Staraya Russa. The plan of the operation and the directives for its conduct by the Headquarters were adopted even before the aforementioned January meeting at the Headquarters.

In the course of carrying out this operation by the three indicated fronts, by the end of January - mid-February 1942, it became clear that the task of defeating the main forces of the 18th German Army on the outskirts of Leningrad and the 16th German Army with counter strikes from the fronts was practically not being fulfilled. The connection of the right wing of the North-Western Front with the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts will not happen in the future. Therefore, this operation was named Lyubanskaya for the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts and Demyanskaya for the right wing of the Northwestern Front.

It should be noted that even in February 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command reminded the North-Western Front of the need to fulfill the goals set for the front of the operation to cut off the communications of the German troops to assist the Volkhov Front.

–  –  –

CHAPTER 3. THE BEGINNING OF THE OPERATION ON THE NORTH-WESTERN FRONT

The offensive of the right wing of the Northwestern Front began on January 7, 1942.

Anyone who has been in those places knows these endless, majestic forests, endless swamps and swamps, large lakes, scattered and lost villages in dense thickets. There are very few roads and, in general, directions suitable for the action of large masses of troops. It's in fully refers both to the area south of Lake Ilmen (Staraya Russa region), and to the areas north of the lake and the city of Novgorod.

The winter was harsh and snowy. Blizzards covered the few paths so much that the troops had to move forward with great difficulty, laying trenches in huge snow layers. During the day they were cleared, and at night everything was covered again. The troops that got into impassability were forced to make their own way and maintain it themselves in a passable state, spending a lot of time and effort on this.

It was necessary to visit there in the memorable winter of 1941-42 in order to fully appreciate all the many difficulties that arose at every step.

Kurochkin writes in his memoirs: “The command tried to make full use of nature, the features of the terrain. What was difficult for oneself was made difficult for the enemy. Snow, blizzard, blizzard turned out to be not only an enemy, but also an ally. Sometimes a solid white haze covered the movement of our troops. Wrapped in a white shroud, they became invisible to enemy observers, and not one of his reconnaissance aircraft dared to take to the air on such days ...

“... The enemy's defense was not continuous.

The Germans occupied the villages, preparing them for all-round defense and turning them into strongholds with great engineering and tactical skill. The enemy blocked all the roads, all the ways and approaches that were more or less suitable for our offensive ... Quiet snow-covered fields in front of the villages could turn into pitch hell in an instant, as soon as we went on the offensive. Every meter of space was shot through by numerous machine guns, guns lurking in the villages...

In those conditions of the terrain, each step of the attacker is heavy in itself, even without an enemy. And here any farm, each village is a kind of small fortress...

Everything I write about here is by no means aimed at emphasizing or somehow exaggerating our hardships. Of course, the reader understands that it is more difficult to conduct an offensive in forests and swamps waist-deep in snow and without roads than in dry, flat places. But in war - as in war!

I am writing about this here only to tell, especially to our youth, about the conditions in which we sometimes have to fight. War is always difficult." (Kurochkin Ya.A., We fought on the North-Western Front. Collection “On the North-Western Front 1941-1943. - M .: Nauka, 1969. - P. 24) It should be noted that the offensive of the right wing of the North-Western Front started under favorable weather conditions. Because of the severe frosts, the swamps froze well. And where in the autumn small partisan groups made their way with great difficulty, now companies and battalions with tanks were secretly led behind enemy lines.

Using the complete surprise of the attack, the troops of the 11th Army were able to break through the enemy defenses on the first day of the operation and advance up to 7 km. The strike force of the army as part of the 182nd Infantry Division of Colonel M.S. Nazarov, 84th - Major General P.I. Fomenko and the 188th - Colonel T.I. Rybakov, in a few days of fighting on virgin snow, they advanced more than 50 km, bypassed the right flank of the enemy’s 290th Infantry Division and started a battle on the northern and eastern outskirts of Staraya Russa. Part of the ski battalions, which crossed Lake Ilmen on the ice, cut the roads leading from Staraya Russa to Shimsk and reached the approaches to it.

Many examples of the heroism of the soldiers of the 11th Army in the offensive that had begun could be cited.

One of the regiments of the 11th Army, unexpectedly for the enemy, went through riverbeds to Staraya Russa, which at that time was tens of kilometers from the front. This regiment was led by 67-year-old Mayata village old-timer Ivan Vasilyevich Lipatov.

I.V. Lipatov brought the soldiers of the second battalion of Captain A.F. Velichko from the 595th regiment of the 188th rifle division to the village of Podborovye. As a result of a short battle, the numerous local garrison, taken by surprise, was destroyed. Wasting no time, the battalion, reinforced by part of the first battalion, moved towards the city, and the third - by senior lieutenant N.A. Gubsky - hit on Talyshno.

In night hand-to-hand combat, the Velichko battalion liberated the suburban village of Bryashnaya Gora, then broke into Kozmodemyanskaya Street (now Velichko). Again the same picture - the confused Nazis. Here are the "Arakcheev barracks". Under the barbed wire, the soldiers saw piles of dead bodies and ... traces of the recent massacre. Several corpses of enemy soldiers and even shepherd dogs testified to the courageous fight of unarmed people with the executioners.

As it turned out later, the prisoners were taken to Volotovskoye Highway and machine-gunned. The Germans also acted with the prisoners of the camp at base 104 (western outskirts).

In the early morning of January 11, the commander of the 11th Army, Lieutenant General V.I. Morozov received another order from the front commander: "Russa must be taken today and this is a matter of honor for the 11th Army." The onslaught was stepped up, not knowing that von Busch had already managed to transfer the elite SS Reich division to help the garrison. Several more villages around the city were taken. But only the 114th separate ski battalion, which had gone behind enemy lines, was able to break through into Staraya Russa (and then only late at night). At the same time, on the other side, near Bryashnaya Gora, after the death of the commander, the remnants of the Velichko battalion made their way back to their own. Only six people came out with Lieutenant Ilya Shapovalenko.

The 114th battalion, after the battle in the center, retreated to the flax mill. Part of the fighters had to be sent with the wounded, and they managed to get out. The rest were headed by political instructor S.M. Malofeevsky and Lieutenant F.V. Ivashko.

In the early morning, under the cover of armored personnel carriers, the enemy launched an attack ... The locals will forever remember the day of January 12, 1942. Thirty Soviet soldiers who survived after a fierce battle were escorted to the Gestapo. Bloody, half-dressed, they walked barefoot along the icy road with their heads held high. Along with them was a girl - a medical instructor. When the column returned, the streets were empty, the Germans, threatening to shoot them, forbade even approaching the windows.

The Red Army soldiers were led back to the flax mill...

What happened next - learned only after the liberation of the city. At that time, on January 12, 1942, the inhabitants of the nearest bunkers and dugouts heard the singing of the Internationale coming from the direction of the plant. The Red Army soldiers were walled up. And the proletarian anthem sounded until the last brick closed the hole.

Part of the forces of the 11th Army blocked the strongholds on the river. Fishing northeast and east of the city in order to cut off its garrison from the Demyansk group of Germans and from the main forces of Army Group North.

However, as General Kurochkin recalls, “Already on January 11, the first alarming symptoms of the fading pace of the offensive of the 11th Army appeared. The 84th Rifle Division lagged behind in the deep snow. Artillery units and rear moved with great difficulty. On this day in the morning, we sent the commander of the army, General V.I.

Morozov the following telegram:

“In order to resolve the issue of capturing Staraya Russa, it is extremely necessary to speed up the actions of the 84th SD ... In addition, the regiment of the second echelon of the 188th SD can also be thrown to attack Staraya Russa and all other forces of the army at your discretion ...

Comrade just called. Stalin instructed me to tell you personally that Russa must be taken today, and this is a matter of honor for the 11th Army. Don't forget artillery and don't be shy about shells.

In the middle of the day, we sent General V.I. Another telegram to Morozov: “The directive of the Headquarters has just been received. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders the capture of the city of Staraya Russa within 11 January. To solve this problem, pull together all the artillery of the RGK, divisions of the RS, at your request, all available front-line aviation will work.

However, the fighting developed very slowly. It was not possible to take Staraya Russa on the move. The artillery of the 11th Army lagged behind in deep snow, the rifle units attacked the city without sufficient fire support.

The regrouping of the army was carried out slowly. The enemy is firmly in the city. He prepared strong strongholds. From the outskirts of the city, shots were heard literally from every house ... Our fragile, with large gaps, the encirclement ring around Staraya Russa did not provide reliable isolation of the enemy grouping.

Unfortunately, some commanders, having no experience, were sometimes too hasty with attacks, often repeating them without proper organization. The absence of a single simultaneous strike by the formations of the 11th Army against the garrison in the city could not ensure success.

The enemy offered stubborn resistance. The battles for Staraya Russa took on a protracted character. The 11th Army, leaving the enemy garrison blockaded in Staraya Russa, turned south ... and began to successfully advance towards Ramushev. (Kurochkin, ibid., pp. 28, 33).

The turn to the south by the 11th Army was carried out in pursuance of the combat order of the North-Western Front No. 001 of January 12, 1942.

CHAPTER 4. THE BEGINNING OF THE OPERATION ON THE VOLKHOV AND LENINGRAD FRONTS

Having briefly covered in the previous section the initial stage of the operation of the troops of the right wing of the North-Western Front, let's move on to considering the course of the operation of the troops of the Volkhov Front.

Having received the directive of the Stavka dated 12/17/1941, the Volkhov Front Directorate, directing the military operations of the 4th and 52nd armies, launched work to prepare an offensive operation. According to the orientation of the General Staff, the arrival of the first echelons of troops of the 2nd shock and 59th armies was expected from December 22 to 25. On this basis, readiness for the offensive was planned for December 26-27, and the offensive itself for December 28.

When planning the operation, the front command proceeded from the assumption that the 4th and 52nd armies, while pursuing the retreating enemy during the Tikhvin offensive operation, would occupy bridgeheads on the western bank of the Volkhov on the move and ensure the introduction of fresh divisions of the 59th and 2nd shock armies.

As a result of a successful counteroffensive, the troops of the 4th and 52nd armies cleared the territory east of the Volkhov and reached the right bank of the river.

However, the exhausted, tired troops of these armies were unable not only to surround and destroy the retreating enemy troops, but also to overcome the Volkhov defensive line of the Germans and seize bridgeheads on the western bank of the river in size sufficient for the covert accumulation of troops and the deployment of a further offensive by our fresh armies (2nd strike and 59th). Entering them into a breakthrough from the move now fell away, because. the enemy was entrenched behind the river. It was possible to continue the operation only by breaking through the enemy defenses again. This required changes in the planning of the operation, which was originally based on the continuation of the successful Tikhvin counter-offensive with the introduction of fresh additional forces.

Such a change was also dictated by the delay in the concentration of the strike force of the troops of the Volkhov Front. The postponement required additional measures: conducting reconnaissance of the enemy and his fortifications, a more powerful artillery grouping, bringing in more ammunition to break through the defense, etc.

Despite the very difficult situation of the Leningraders and the demands of the leadership of the Leningrad Front and the city to speed up the start of the operation, at the request of the Military Council of the Volkhov Front, the Headquarters postponed the transition to the offensive to January 7, 1942 (10 days later than planned).

“Nevertheless, by the appointed time, the front was not ready for the offensive. The reason was the delay in the concentration of troops. In the 59th Army, they arrived on time and only five divisions managed to turn around, and three divisions were on the way. In the 2nd shock army, a little more than half of the formations occupied their initial position. The rest of the formations, army artillery, vehicles and some units followed the only railway. Aviation did not arrive either. (Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people. - M., 1983, p.240).

On the right wing of the Volkhov Front, in the sector of Kirishi, Lezno, the 4th Army operated, commanded by Major General P.A. Ivanov. He distinguished himself during the Tikhvin operation, commanding an operational group of troops in the same army. A member of the Military Council was the divisional commissar I.V. Zuev. Chief of Staff - Colonel P.S. Vinogradov. It consisted of seven rifle divisions: 44, 377, 310, 4th Guards, 65, 191 and 91, one tank brigade (46th) and three tank battalions (119th, 120th and 128th). All of them were greatly weakened in previous battles and had a large shortage of people and weapons.

To the left, on the front of Zavizh, Dymno, the newly arrived 59th Army, commanded by Major General I.V. Galanin. Before this appointment, Galanin fought on the Southern Front, for some time he commanded the 12th Army there. Corps Commissar P.A. was a member of the Military Council. Dibrov. Chief of Staff - Colonel L.A. Pern. It was the most strong army front. It had seven rifle divisions: 378, 372, 376, 111,374,366 and 382nd and two tank battalions (185th and 166th).

South of the 59th Army on the front of Krupichno, Russa, the newly arrived 2nd General Shock Army (commander - Lieutenant General I.V. Galanin G.G. Sokolov) took its initial position. After January 10, Lieutenant General N.K. was appointed commander. Klykov. A member of the Military Council was Brigadier Commissar A.I. Mikhailov. Chief of Staff - Major General Vizzhilin. It included one rifle division (327th), seven rifle brigades (22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 57th, 58th and 59th) and two tank battalions (160th and 162nd).

To the left of the 2nd shock army to the lake. Ilmen, the 52nd Army turned around, which was first commanded by Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov. After January 10, Lieutenant General V.F. took command. Yakovlev. A member of the Military Council was the divisional commissar K.L. Pantas. Chief of Staff - Colonel B.A. Christmas. The army included five rifle divisions (267, 305, 225, 46, 259th) and one cavalry division (80th). All of them had a shortage in personnel, lacked artillery.

The arrivals of the 59th and 2nd shock armies had a lot of supply difficulties. Front for a short time did not have time to organize and arrange the rear, N.K. Klykov to accumulate the necessary supplies. The troops were in need of everything: ammunition, food, fuel, fodder. A number of staff officers did not have the experience of staff work and did not get used to their duties properly. There was no such important element in the work of headquarters as cohesion. The front also did not have the opportunity to organize combat training with them and catch up.

If we add to all this that it was winter, deep snow and forests blocked the path of our troops and fettered maneuver, then all the difficulties that arose in the path of our troops and, ultimately, influenced the development of the operation, would become clear.

The commander of the troops of the Volkhov Front decided: while conducting an offensive with all armies, the main blow should be delivered by the forces of two new armies (2nd shock and 59th).

The main efforts of the front were thus concentrated in the center - on the Lezno, Dubrovka sector (60 km), where more than half of the combined arms formations and the bulk of the artillery were deployed. Attacks were planned in three directions: Kirishi-Tosno (4th Army); along the railway to Chudovo-Lyuban (59th Army) and west of the railway (2nd Shock Army); and the third direction to Novgorod (52nd Army).

For a number of reasons, the 2nd shock army was at the center of the events of the offensive that had begun. She had the task of breaking through the enemy defenses along the western bank of the river. Volkhov and go out with the main forces (by the end of January 19, 1942) on the river. Kerest. In the future, advance in the direction of Finev Lug, Chasha station, Nizovsky junction. With access to the Leningrad-Dno railway, it was intended to make a turn to strike at Luga.

(TsAMO RF, f.204, op.97, d.8, ll.72-78). (See the scheme of tasks for fronts on p.13).

Despite the fact that the 2nd shock army failed to complete this task in full, nevertheless it left the greatest mark on the Luban operation. For almost half a year, by attracting and grinding enemy reserves, the army diverted the attention of the enemy command from Leningrad and thereby ensured the overall survivability of its defense.

§4.1. THE FIRST ATTEMPT OF THE OFFENSIVE On January 7, 1942, the front moved into the Volkhov table offensive. But only two battalions of the 1002nd succeeded in crossing the Volkhov and gaining a foothold. Rarely, friends, we have to meet the rifle regiment of the 305th rifle division, the 52nd army, the soldiers of the 376th and 378th riflemen. divisions of the 59th Army. Warriors of the 376th division Let's remember what happened (commander Lieutenant Colonel D.N. Ugorich) and we'll drink, as usual, As it was customary in Russia.

How many days did they hold on to Volkhov to the north of vil. Pertechno, they destroyed about a regiment of guitars. In the frozen dugouts lay, The battalion of the 1256th Infantry Regiment Fought on Ladoga, the 378th Division captured the first German fought on the Volkhov, a trench, but the enemy quickly came to his senses, Did not retreat a single step.

pressed the attackers to the ground with machine-gun fire, counterattacked. The division commander half- Let's drink for those who commanded the companies, kovnik I.P. Dorofeev brought into action the second Who was dying in the snow, echelons of regiments, but the fire superiority of Who in Leningrad forced the enemy in the evening under cover to make his way through the swamps, with snowfall to return to their original positions, breaking the throat of the enemy!

On January 8, the 378th division undertook P.N. Shubin made a new attempt to advance after a short artillery preparation. One battalion of the 1256th Rifle Regiment and a company of the 164th Separate Tank Battalion crossed the Volkhov again and captured the enemy's stronghold east of vil. Useful. The Germans repeatedly counterattacked, but the battalion Art. Lieutenant N.N. Sokolov held firm and did not give up his positions.

Some of the successes noted here have taken place in separate sections and secondary directions. However, the offensive of the units of the 59th Army ended in failure.

Let us turn to the beginning of the actions of the 2nd shock army. On January 1, 1942, the army commander ordered the formation commanders to personally reconnoiter and study the theater of upcoming military operations on January 2 (involving commanders up to platoon commanders to participate in it). These areas are indicated in the table below, compiled according to the documents available in the archive. For comparison, the last column of the table indicates the areas in which then, by order of the commander No. 01 of January 6, 1942, these formations, in fact, began offensive battles.

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As can be seen from the table, the 24th brigade was supposed to reconnoiter the area where, according to order No. 01, the 23rd brigade was actually advancing; and the 23rd brigade was to reconnoiter the area, which was then attacked by the 327th division and the 58th brigade.

The offensive of the 2nd shock army, in accordance with the order of the commander No. 01 of January 6, 1942, was to begin on January 7 at 10 am. The army was to break through the first line of the German defense at the junction of the 126th and the right flank of the 215th German infantry divisions, and then defeat the 25th Wehrmacht infantry division at the second line of defense of the Germans.

The order provided that the 25th separate rifle brigade would break through the German front at the Dymno-Vysokoye line (7.5 km) and, in a further offensive, cover the right flank of the army; The 57th separate rifle brigade destroys the Germans at the Vysokoye - Novye Buregi line (7.5 km), then breaks through to the Novgorod-Chudovo railway west of the village of Kolyazhka; The 327th Rifle Division advances at the Novye Buregi - Gorodok line (5 km) with the aim of breaking through to the railway in the Mostki - Spasskaya Polist section; The 58th separate rifle brigade breaks through the German defenses in the Gorodok-Gorelovo sector (1.5 km) and then captures the Myasnoy Bor-Lyubino Pole railway section; The 23rd separate rifle brigade breaks through the German defenses in the Gorelovo Zmeysko sector (3 km) and then breaks through to the railway between Myasny Bor and Gorodishche 2; The 24th separate rifle brigade breaks through the German defenses in the Zmeysko-Russa section (4 km) and then goes to the railway between the villages of Lyubtsy and Krutik: and in the further offensive it covers the left flank of the army.

Unfortunately, due to poorly established communications, the order of the army commander, sent with messengers, arrived at the headquarters of divisions and brigades with a great delay. Therefore, for example, the 25th separate rifle brigade launched an offensive at 11.00 in the morning, and units of the 327th rifle division at that time were just reaching their starting position and replacing the units that had defended there before the 52nd army.

The headquarters of the 2nd shock army reported this to the headquarters of the Volkhov Front with operational report No. 13 / op at 16.00 on 07.01.42: “2. The combat order No. 01 / op of the army for the offensive on 7.1.42 arrived at the headquarters of brigades and divisions with a great delay. 3. 25th brigade launched the offensive at 11.00; 327 sd parts went to their original position and replaced parts of 52 A; The 58th Rifle Regiment began the offensive at 13.00, advancing to the line of Shevelevo, Vylegy, were met by strong enemy mortar fire from the direction of Yamno. 4.

The position of the remaining parts is not specified due to the lack of communication. Measures have been taken to establish communication. (TsAMO, f.309, f.4073, d.2, l.42).

These days the frost exceeded 30 degrees. For example, on January 3rd, a thermometer in the area above the river. Volkhov showed 32 degrees. The snow cover was up to 1.5 meters deep. It was necessary to move through the forests without roads, since those roads that were available were covered with deep snow. Severe frosts and difficult conditions of the way when the units were moved to their original positions on the front line exhausted the people. From the very beginning, the author took part in this operation as part of the 23rd separate rifle brigade as a gunner. Our brigade went on the offensive a day later than the time set by order of the army commander.

A significant number of units of the brigade could not reach their original positions on time. One infantry and mortar (50-82 mm) battalion, as well as a mortar division of 120-mm mortars with a delivery vehicle, arrived at the Malaya Vishera unloading station only on the evening of January 6th.

The brigade began the fight for the German defense unit, organized at the Red Shock Worker state farm, located on the western bank of the river. Volkhov.

To break through to the state farm, it was necessary to cross the frozen Volkhov. The starting positions for the offensive of our battalion were in the trenches of the part of the 52nd Army that we replaced, located not on the river bank, but at a distance of more than 500 meters from the river. Volkhov to the right of the village of Gorelovo. When going on the offensive, we had to overcome this open space to the river. There was deep snow along the way. The matter was aggravated by the fact that we did not have camouflage suits and skis (except for the mouths of submachine gunners and reconnaissance).

There was no artillery preparation on our sector. From the beginning of our movement (the Germans seemed to be waiting for this moment), machine-gun and mortar shelling began. From heavy losses along the way to the western bank of the river and then to the enemy positions, which seemed very long to us, only deep snow and the fact that we were moving in it by crawling could save. The fire was so strong that it was impossible to raise their heads or kneel - only crawling in the snow. By 15 o'clock we managed with great difficulty to reach the middle of the river. Having advanced to the western coast, we came under even stronger shelling. The tanks assigned to the brigade did not accompany us. They could not cross the river. The ice was not explored, and there were no crossings for tanks.

After a day of heavy fighting, on the orders of the brigade commander, our battalions retreated to their original positions. In our brigade, 50 people were killed and 302 wounded. The offensive of other rifle brigades of the army developed just as slowly and unsuccessfully.

The only strong unit of the army was the 327th Rifle Division. She acted to the right of the 23rd and 58th separate rifle brigades. Army Combat Order No. 01 dated 01/06/1942 only for her and for the 58th division. page of the brigade was provided for the support of army artillery.

However, in the offensive launched by the army on order No. 01, this most powerful formation of the army did not take any practical part. Its units did not have time to concentrate and reach the starting line in time (this is stated in the above operational summary of the headquarters of the 2nd shock army No. 13 / OP).

Commander of the 327th Rifle Division, Major General I.M. Antyufeev, in his memoirs on this occasion, only pointed out that the offensive was not successful and that the artillery not only could not suppress enemy fire weapons, but did not even have time to properly zero in.

The army artillery, even at 8 pm on January 7, was not yet firing at the enemy, but was only withdrawing materiel to the designated areas. (TsAMO RF, f.309, o.4073, d.2, l.43; Agapov M.M. 23rd separate rifle brigade in the battle for Leningrad, 1999, p.10-11).

The offensive on the Krupichno, Russa sector was also unsuccessful.

The troops of the front in fierce battles tried to break through the enemy defenses, but to no avail. All day on January 8, the formations of the 2nd shock army fought heavy battles.

Therefore, the command of the front, with the permission of the Headquarters, stopped the offensive. In the operational summary of the headquarters of the 2nd shock army No. 16 / op on

At 20:00 hours on January 8, it was indicated that, according to the order of the front commander, the further offensive was suspended. When it got dark, the troops retreated. (TsAMO RF, f.309, o.4073, d.2, l.47).

However, the onslaught of the Volkhovites was strong. A German officer who fought at the Tigoda station against the 310th Infantry Division of the 4th Army wrote in his diary on January 10, 1942: “The Russians give us a lot of work. The question is whether or not to be the northern front. The German high command also understood this threat. General F. Halder wrote in his Diary: “An enemy attack was repulsed on the Volkhov sector. Here and in the region of Lake Ladoga, a major enemy offensive is approaching. From this we can conclude that the enemy mistook our poorly organized offensive for nothing more than reconnaissance in force.

Colonel of the Wehrmacht H. Polman in his book “Volkhov. 900 days of fighting for Leningrad. 1941-1944 "directly writes:" The battle began near Volkhov in the zone of the 38th Army Corps on the adjacent flanks of the 126th and 215th Infantry Divisions on January 13, after several reconnaissance attempts.

“The fighting showed,” writes in his memoirs “In the Service of the People”, the former commander of the Volkhov Front, K.A. Meretskov, - unsatisfactory training of troops and staffs. The commanders and staffs failed to manage the units and organize interaction between them.

To eliminate the identified shortcomings, the Military Council of the front asked the Headquarters to postpone the operation for another three days ... The start of the offensive ... was postponed to January 13, 1942.

Corresponding organizational conclusions were drawn from the failed offensive: on the proposal of the Military General Council of the front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was convinced of prof. V.F. Yakovlev of the unsuitability of the army commander of the 2nd shock Sokolov, and on January 10 he was recalled to Moscow, appointing Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov, who was replaced in his former post of commander of the 52nd Army by Lieutenant General V.F. Yakovlev.

On the same day, January 10, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, signed by Stalin and Vasilevsky, sent Directive No. 03 to Meretskov and the fronts demanding the use of the basics of military leadership. She demanded that the commanders of units and formations "learn to interact." The directive reminded of the need to concentrate forces during the offensive, in connection with which followed a strict order "to prohibit the deployment of separate divisions in a chain" and ordered "to create shock groups of 3-4 divisions" and emphasized that "only the combined actions of shock groups ... can ensure the success of the offensive. (USSR in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, p. 156; TsAMO RF, F. 408., o. 9991., d. 24, ll. 12-14).

It was no longer sudden. Enemy reconnaissance discovered not only the preparation of the front for the offensive, but quite accurately established the direction of concentration of the main efforts. In the combat log of Army Group North for January 1942, we find an entry: “Reconnaissance shows a clear creation of the direction of the enemy’s main attack in front of the front of the 126th Infantry Division and in front of the right flank of the 215th Infantry Division. In addition, major preparations for the offensive are being made against the bridgeheads of Gruzino and Kirishi, as well as in the northeastern section of the army on both sides of Pogost. Having received such information about our intentions, the fascist German command took a number of appropriate measures. It regrouped, replacing the battered in the battles near Tikhvin with full-blooded formations. The heavily weakened tank and motorized divisions of the 39th motorized corps, withdrawn to the Lyuban region, were hastily put in order, replenished with people and equipment. With the help of troops, prisoners of war and the local population, the depth of defense was created: trenches were dug, settlements were fortified, winter roads were laid, etc. (Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people. 1983. - P. 242-243).

The enemy met the offensive of our troops at well-prepared positions, equipped with a system of resistance nodes and strong points, with a large number of bunkers and machine-gun platforms. The leading edge of the German defense, basically, passed along the western bank of the river. Volkhov. The mirror of the river was shot through with dense oblique and flank fire. The second defensive line passed along the embankment of the railway line and the Kirishi Novgorod highway. It was a line of fortified strongholds in populated areas and at heights with well-organized fire communications between them. The entire space between the Volkhov River and the railway line was densely covered with engineering barriers: barbed wire fences, forest blockages, minefields and land mines. The steep western bank of the river was splashed in places with water, and its icy surface was a formidable obstacle for infantry without special equipment.

The strongholds were saturated with machine guns and mortars. The operational depth of defense was a system of nodes, equipped mainly in settlements. The defense was supported by powerful artillery and fairly strong aircraft.

To hold the Volkhov line, the Germans used parts of the 1st and 38th army corps consisting of eight (11, 21, 254, 291, 61, 215, 216) German infantry divisions and the 250th Spanish division. The 39th motorized corps was in the operational reserve. The 285th security division was located in the depths. In total, there were 13 enemy divisions in front of the front. Almost all of them were fully equipped, well trained and provided with sufficient weapons and ammunition.

Our troops were technically inferior to the enemy due to objective factors. Compared to ours, German formations and units had more automatic weapons, vehicles, mechanization and construction of defensive structures and roads. Were better provided with means of communication. All the armies of the front were purely infantry in our country. Troops moved exclusively on foot. The mobility of the troops was extremely low. We did not have necessary quantity tanks and aircraft to support infantry on the battlefield. It was a time when the technique of the enemy dominated on the ground and in the air.

For a number of reasons, the industry of the USSR, for the second half of 1941, produced such a quantity of military products that made up for the losses of the army in small arms by only 30 percent, in artillery - by 57, in tanks - by 27 and in combat aircraft - by 55 percent. .

In other words, by the beginning of 1942, the combat capability of the troops of the active army had not yet been fully restored and, naturally, there were not enough weapons to equip the deployable formations, which were intended to strengthen the fronts and make a decisive contribution to the winter offensive of the Soviet troops. (“Military History Journal”, 1990, No. 3, p. 16).

The deliveries of military equipment to the Soviet Union by the Allies under the Lend-Lease agreement began only in October 1941. They were significantly lower than the quantities agreed by the parties. In 1941, 204 aircraft were delivered instead of the 699 provided for by the protocol, tanks - 182, instead of the agreed 750. These quantities could not contribute a significant velad to the Red Army in the winter offensive of 1941-1942.

In the 2nd shock army, four separate rifle brigades (22nd, 23rd, 24th and 25th) were an exception in this respect. They began to form in October-November 1941 in the Kharkov Military District as shock cadet brigades. Their core was made up of cadets from various military educational institutions, as well as fighters who arrived after being treated in hospitals. These units were fully staffed with artillery and small arms and had a fairly high saturation of automatic weapons for that time: each brigade had 529 SVT automatic rifles and 19 PPD assault rifles. They were not provided only with radio stations relying on the state. (MM.

Agapov. 23rd separate rifle brigade in the battle for Leningrad, 1999, pp.5-6).

At the beginning of the operation, there were no rear and support units and institutions on the Volkhov Front in the 2nd shock and 59th armies. Therefore, the fighters had to temporarily experience great difficulties in supply. Often the cargoes went to the old addresses of the connections to completely different areas. The armies that previously existed here from their bases could give very little. The formations and units of the newly arrived armies did not accumulate combat experience. A number of staff officers had no staff experience. But the situation developed in such a way that the front also did not have the opportunity to organize combat training with them and catch up. The personnel of some formations did not live in the forests and had no experience of fighting in a wooded and swampy area.

The troops of the newly created front were not provided with sufficient ammunition.

The Volkhov Front effectively used the additional time (January 9-13) provided by the Stavka to the front to better prepare the offensive. This can be seen from the actions of the 23rd Separate Rifle Brigade described below according to the documents that the author has.

By the beginning of the first offensive, the engineer company of the brigade did not have time to conduct engineering reconnaissance and engineering training in the offensive zone. The units of the brigade did not carry out reconnaissance actions.

In connection with the above, the headquarters of the 2nd shock army on January 9, by combat order No. 02, ordered the commander of the 23rd separate rifle brigade to organize engineering reconnaissance of the crossing of tanks (up to 60 tons) across the river. Volkhov and start harvesting timber for the construction of the crossing. In accordance with the order of the army headquarters, the sapper company of the brigade conducted reconnaissance of the thickness of the ice on the river, the steepness of the banks, the availability of timber to reinforce the ice and the construction of a crossing for tanks. In addition, she prepared timber for the crossing, conducted reconnaissance and cleared eight minefields in the area of ​​​​the battalion offensive. Inconspicuous obstacles were removed, advance paths were cleared, roads were cleared, etc. (TsAMO RF, f.309, f.4073, d.8, l.10; f.1812, f.1, d.4, l.6, 11;

The reconnaissance units of the brigade conducted night searches in order to capture prisoners and identify enemy fire weapons in the offensive area.

Exploration was carried out in the area with. Plotishno and the Red Shock Worker state farm with one group on the night of January 11 and two platoons on the night of January 13, 1942. They failed to capture prisoners. One platoon under the command of ml. Lieutenant Svidovsky Ivan Sergeevich was tasked with identifying enemy firepower at the Red Shock Worker state farm. The platoon, under heavy machine-gun fire in deep snow, advanced across the river and came close to the village of the state farm. The platoon took the blow and completed the task. The necessary data was transferred to the gunners. Svidovsky was awarded a government award with the medal "For Courage". (Agapov M.M. 23rd separate rifle brigade in the battle for Leningrad. 1999, pp. 12-13). The additional period of preparation for the offensive (from January 9 to 13) was effectively used by other formations of the army.

In the operational reports and memoirs of the participants in the operation, one can read that in most sectors of the offensive of our troops, the morning of January 13, 1942 turned out to be sunny. Towards the end of the artillery preparation, the wind picked up and swirled the wind. Shooting chains moved to the attack. Before the enemy trenches, it was necessary to overcome 800-1000 meters of open space with a frost of over 30 degrees and a snow depth of up to 1.5 m. Not everyone managed to cross the flat surface of the Volkhov River.

Let's start the review of hostilities from the right flank of the front, where the 4th Army was advancing. It was here that the operation envisaged by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (directive of December 17, 1941) began to encircle the Mginsko-Ladoga group of German troops by the 4th army of the Volkhov and 54th army of the Leningrad fronts.

§4.3. COMBAT OPERATION TO ENROUND THE MGINSKOLADOZH GROUP OF GERMAN TROOPS

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The 4th Army fought in the Kirishi area. Kirishi is a settlement, whose name was given to the enemy bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river. Volkhov, held by the Nazi troops during the retreat from Tikhvin in December 1941. The bridgehead included the village of Dobrovolny, the Kirishi railway station, Plavnitsy, Novinki, vil. Kirishi and, in fact, the village of Kirishi, where the industrial buildings of the chemical and woodworking plants have been preserved. The Nazis adapted these buildings and the railway track for defense, having managed to dig deep into the ground and create a fairly dense, branched fire system.

From the very beginning, the bridgehead attracted significant forces of our 4th Army and fettered its maneuver in solving the main task of the offensive operation of the front. The 4th Army, as indicated in the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of December 17, 1941, was supposed to: “... advance in the general direction of Kirishi, Tosno and, in cooperation with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, encircle and destroy the enemy who advanced north of Mga to Lake Ladoga ". (TsAMO RF, f. 204, o.89, d.50, ll.135-137).

As a first step in fulfilling this task, the army had to clear the eastern bank of the river from the enemy. Volkhov and take possession of bridgeheads on the opposite bank of the river, capacious enough for further development offensive.

The army troops began to carry out this task as soon as they reached the river. Volkhov. In the last days of December 1941, they managed to capture in the area of ​​​​st. Tigoda and north of Vodose are two small bridgeheads. To expand them, the formations of the army regrouped and began to attack the enemy. However, repeated attacks were unsuccessful. They claimed many lives, weakening the already weakened parts more and more. By the time the front troops went over to the general offensive, the divisions that were part of the 4th Army each had no more than 3,500 people. Lacked artillery, mortars, automatic weapons.

The enemy felt this and, pulling fresh forces here, began to show activity. On January 13, 1942, on the day the front troops went over to the general offensive, the Nazis themselves attacked units of the 4th Army, which had reached the left bank of the river. Volkhov, trying to throw them off the bridgeheads. Having beaten off the enemy attack, the troops of the 4th Army struck back. But it turned out to be weak and did not bring tangible results.

The fighting in the Kirishi area, now flaring up, then fading, continued until October 1943. This bridgehead was in a very sensitive direction. From here there were the shortest routes to the east - to Tikhvin and to the north-west to Leningrad. The fascist German command considered it a springboard from which they hoped, under favorable conditions, to again strike at Tikhvin and unite with the Finns.

In addition, the bridgehead, located on the left flank of the Chudovolubanskaya enemy grouping, was a kind of shield covering this grouping from the blows of our troops, ensuring the stability of its positions. That is why personnel divisions with high combat capability, formed in East Prussia, were involved in the defense of the Kirishi bridgehead. On the bridgehead, units of the first 11th and 21st infantry divisions consistently defended. Later, the 217th, followed by the 61st Infantry Division, defended here. By the time the bridgehead fell, units of the 132nd Infantry Division were defending it. For the stubborn defense of the bridgehead, the Nazi command assigned the name "grenadier" to the most distinguished divisions and regiments.

The Kirishi bridgehead of the enemy not only diverted the forces of our troops from solving the main tasks, but most importantly, it fettered the maneuver of the army troops, tying them hand and foot. Therefore, the liquidation of the Kirishi bridgehead would be of positive significance not only for the army, but for the entire front. To throw the German troops from the Kirishi bridgehead, the 4th Army carried out several private operations.

Fighting on the site of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front

To the right of the 4th Army of the Volkhov Front, the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front operated.

The 54th Army, pursuing the defeated enemy troops near Voybokalo and Volkhov during the Tikhvin offensive operation, reached the Voronovo, Pogostye, Nov. line at the end of December 1941 with its left wing. Kirishi (see cards on pages 7, 8). Here, among the icy swamps, in some places covered with forest and shrubs sunk in the snow, there was a railway, which the retreating German troops grabbed. In the embankment of the canvas, which towered 1.5 - 2.5 meters above the snowy plain, they equipped machine-gun nests and artillery positions for anti-tank guns, dug out cells for machine gunners, built dugouts, cracks and other shelters.

The army was faced with the task of going on the offensive simultaneously with the troops of the Volkhov Front so that, in cooperation with the 4th Army, which was striking in the direction of Tosno, to encircle and destroy the enemy troops that had advanced to Lake Ladoga.

Commander of the 54th Army, Major General I.I. Fedyuninsky (12/30/41) demanded that the formations that had by this time reached the line of Lodva, Larionov Ostrov, break through the enemy defenses by rail and capture the line of Caps, Pogostye, Konduya, Zenino. (TsAMO RF, f.410, op.10122, d.61, l.71).

For several days, units of the army attacked the enemy's defensive positions, but the progeneral could not tear them apart. The most successful was 80I.I. Fedyuninsky Rifle Division of Colonel P.F. Brygin. Her 77th regiment, under the command of Colonel S.A. Sherstov, having overcome the railway embankment southeast of the Zharok junction and having gone deep into the rear of the enemy defense by almost 8 km, occupied the village of Konduya. Another, 153rd regiment of the same division, under the command of Major A.P. Zhigulova, moved even further and drove the enemy out of the village of Zenino. However, these regiments could not gain a foothold on the achieved lines. They did not have artillery, anti-tank mines and other means that could be countered by enemy tanks and armored vehicles. Cut off from the supply bases and not feeling the support of the main forces of the army, both regiments, having stayed behind enemy lines for 9 days, crossed the railway in the opposite direction and joined their division.

I.I. Fedyuninsky in the book "Raised by alarm" (M., 1961, p. 92) writes about the reasons for the failure: "... Sufficient superiority over the enemy in forces and means was not created."

Is it so? The 54th Army consisted of ten rifle divisions, a rifle brigade, a marine brigade, two tank brigades and a number of reinforcement units. In the direction of active operations by the beginning of January 1942, there were seven rifle divisions and one tank brigade, which were opposed by units of the enemy's 11th and 96th infantry divisions. If there was no necessary superiority on the entire 30-kilometer offensive front, then in certain directions the forces and means of the army made it possible to have it. In addition, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, given the importance of the task that the 54th Army was solving, allocated two rifle divisions to reinforce it - the 11th and 177th.

Without waiting for the approach of these two divisions, the army commander, taking advantage of the fact that the enemy’s defense was not continuous, but was built according to a system of separate nodes of resistance, sent the 311th rifle division of Colonel S.D. Biyakov to the rear of the enemy. According to the commander, attacking the headquarters of formations, preventing the concentration of reserves and the supply of ammunition, disrupting communications and control, the division should have contributed to the success of our formations advancing from the front.

The actions of the division at first caused alarm in the enemy.

The enemy was forced to send carts under cover of tanks and reinforced patrols. However, the actions of the division did not bring any special results influencing the general course of the army's offensive. In addition, she herself was hourly under enemy air and artillery attacks and was forced to change her position and hide from his reconnaissance. Difficult to the extreme, sometimes almost insoluble, remained the supply of ammunition, food, fodder and the problem of evacuating the wounded and sick. All this, as well as the lack of support from our aviation, hampered the division's maneuver, limiting its combat operations to a small area. The division stayed behind enemy lines until February 1, 1942. Having crossed the front line in the opposite direction, it concentrated in the Pogostye area. After a 10-day rest of the fighters and commanders, on February 11, the division was again brought into battle.

Simultaneously with the deployment of the 311th division behind enemy lines, on January 5, the army commander specified the task of the troops operating in the direction of the main attack, directing their efforts to the section of st. Guesthouse, Zharok junction. (TsAMO RF, f.410, op.10122, d.61, l.78).

On the night of January 6, army troops again attacked enemy positions. Parts of the three divisions 285, 80 and 198 managed to crack the enemy defenses in narrow areas and intercept the embankment of the railway line east of Shala in a small space. However, there was not enough strength to expand the breakthrough. The enemy took advantage of this. With fire and counterattacks, he began to put pressure on the wedged units of our troops, trying to throw them off the railway embankment. During the reflection of the enemy counterattack, the commander of the 80th division, Colonel P.F., was seriously wounded. Brygin. Colonel N.V. took command of the division. Simonov.

The time was approaching for a transition to a general offensive with the troops of the Volkhov Front. The troops of the 54th Army used the remaining days for preparation. Having made the transition on the ice of Lake Ladoga, the 11th Infantry Division of Major General V.I. joined the army. Shcherbakov, significantly increasing the striking force of the army. The commander decided to deliver the main blow in the direction of Pogostye, Shapki, Tosno, going towards the troops of the 55th Army of the Lenfront. (TsAMO RF, f.410, op.10122, d.61, l.82).

This decision was in line with the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of 12/17/1941, but, putting it into practice, the 54th Army turned its back on the Volkhov Front, which played the main role in the beginning operation.

In two months, the Headquarters will correct this decision and order a strike towards the 2nd shock army. But, as we shall see, it will be too late.

The enemy, having revealed the plans of our troops, along the German communications not cut by the 1st shock, 11th armies of the North-Western Front and the 52nd army of the Volkhov Front, will pull up fresh forces to the Lyuban region and take other countermeasures.

In accordance with the decision taken, at the beginning of the operation, the commander of the 54th Army directed the main efforts of the army troops towards Lodva, Shapka, Vinyagolovo, Konduy, Zenino. Korodynya, trying to pave the way to Tosno.

On January 13, 1942, on the day the troops of the Volkhov Front went over to the "repeated" offensive, divisions of the 54th Army on a 20-kilometer front, from Lodva to the Zharok junction, attacked the opposing enemy.

The artillery preparation that preceded the attack was weak.

The enemy's firepower was not suppressed, and the attack was not developed. Only some units of the 285th and 281st rifle divisions managed to overcome the railway embankment, but they were driven back to their original position by the ensuing enemy counterattacks. (TsAMO RF, f.410, op.10122, d.61, ll.84.86).

In the Army Combat Action Journal for that day, it is written, “The general offensive of the army, launched at 10.30 on 13.1.1942, was not successful due to the following reasons:

- the lack of a clear, well-thought-out plan of operation, striking along diverging lines and on a fairly wide front with a small number of divisions;

- the absence of permanent military intelligence, especially flank intelligence;

- the lack of a well-established interaction between artillery and infantry.

Further, the weak work of our aviation and the highly developed enemy fire system were pointed out. (TsAMO RF, f.410, op.10122, d.61, l.87). Speaking about the failures of the offensive, General Fedyuninsky also refers to the same reasons in his memoirs. (Fedyuninsky I.I. Alerted.

– M., 1961, p.97).

On January 16, the army commander again moved the divisions on the offensive, concentrated on the breakthrough sector. However, again, failure. An entry is made in the Army Combat Log:

“The operation plan was not developed, the reconnaissance did not illuminate the area enough, reconnaissance was not carried out, due to the short time allotted for the preparation of the operation. The order was signed at 20.45 on January 15, launched at 22.00, received at 23-24.00. There was no light time at the disposal of the commanders of divisions and regiments. (TsAMO RF, f.410, op.10122, d.61, l.88).

Ordinary fighters, junior and middle commanders knew nothing of this. It never occurred to them that there, at the army headquarters, they could not develop an operation plan and agree on the time and location of the infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation, and the haste shown in organizing the offensive would turn out to be a failure. They believed in their weapons, they knew the task - to destroy the enemy who had taken refuge behind the railway embankment and went forward.

The soldiers of the 11th Infantry Division, advancing on Pogostya, decided to outwit the Nazis. In the dead of January, two groups of sappers, with bags filled with tol, bogged down in the snow to the waist, moved to the front line of the enemy’s defense. Here is the edge of the forest. It was followed by an open snow-covered field. The harassing light of rockets fired from the other side of the field every now and then forced the fighters to burrow into the snow. By 5 o'clock in the morning, the sappers reached the embankment of the railway and began to lay the roof almost under the very nose of the Nazis. The squad leader of the 28th separate engineer battalion, Sergeant B.D. Bukhteev, connected the wires and, holding the cable with his hand, was the last to crawl to the rear.

At dawn there was an explosion. In the place where the chimney of the observation post had just been seen, a huge funnel formed, deeply cutting through the thickness of the embankment. Immediately after the explosion, machine gunners rushed forward. They occupied the gap formed in the embankment. Under their cover, rifle units began to move up. The battle for Pogostye, for the umpteenth time, began to flare up again.

By the evening of January 20, the 177th Rifle Division approached, and in the morning of the next day it went on the attack.

The soldiers of the division met the order to advance with great enthusiasm. Having advanced the guns of the regimental and divisional artillery to direct fire, the artillerymen destroyed the enemy fortifications in the embankment, and the 486th rifle regiment under the command of Major V.I. Nikonov captured the railway, separate units leaked over the road, south into the forest. Despite the first success, this division failed to develop it. (P.

Egorov. "Through forests and swamps", funds of the Museum of military glory of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts).

At the end of January, organizational changes took place in the army.

The entire Sinyavino Group of Forces withdrew from the army and entered on January 27, 1942 under the command of the 8th Army. In the second half of January, the field administration of this army, on the orders of the Leningrad Front, transferred its troops to the newly restored Neva Operational Group, and itself began redeployment, together with army units, from the Nevsky bridgehead across Lake Ladoga beyond the blockade ring to the Volkhov sector. Here she received from the 54th Army part of her sector of the front, adjacent to Lake Ladoga.

February has come. This month in the central part of Russia has always been famous for heavy snowfalls, but in the winter of 1941-1942. there was a lot of snow. He covered swamps with a thick layer, filled forest thickets and clearings.

It was terribly difficult to wade through such virgin snow, especially in the forest, and it was even more difficult to conduct offensive operations. And yet, the soldiers of the 54th Army, attacking the enemy in the Pogost area, did not stop fighting. Sometimes they managed to advance 200-300 meters, occupy a trench or several dugouts, at other times they managed to withstand an enemy counterattack. But regardless of anything, active hostilities did not die out for a single day.

These fights were not even mentioned in the reports of the Information Bureau. But they gave birth to hundreds of heroes: infantrymen, artillerymen, mortarmen, sappers, signalmen, orderlies.

The personnel of the regimental battery of the 502nd regiment of the 177th rifle division, Lieutenant Vasily Petrov, acted fearlessly and with high skill. Having installed the guns on the embankment and under the railway bridge, the artillerymen, firing at close range, from the flank, smashed the firing points and manpower of the enemy. The Nazis, angry with well-aimed shots from Petrov's battery, decided to capture it. Under cover of the morning mist, they attacked. But our observers reported it in time. Having allowed the Nazis to 200 meters, the guns hit with buckshot.

In a few minutes it was all over. The enemy chains seemed to have been blown away by the wind. Only black dots were left lying on the snow, the dead and wounded. (TsAMO RF, f. 410, op. 10139, d. 10, l. 19).

The famous artilleryman, master of direct fire, ml. Lieutenant V.G. Bondarenko. Komsomolets Volodya Bondarenko commanded an artillery platoon from the first days of the war. Started the war as a sergeant. For military successes, he was awarded the military rank of junior lieutenant.

After receiving the order to attack, Bondarenko studied the location of the enemy's firing points, rolled out his guns to the front line and, as soon as the command followed, opened a destructive fire. On this day, his platoon broke 11 bunkers and 5 dugouts, burying about 60 Nazis in them. (TsAMO RF, f.410, op.10175, d.1, l.74).

On February 13, having crossed the ice of Lake Ladoga and made an almost 100-kilometer march along snow-covered roads to the Pogost area, the 124th tank brigade under the command of A.G. approached. Motherland.

The brigade had already met with the enemy more than once, in its ranks there were fearless and experienced tankers. Having taken to waiting positions and received an order to attack, together with the 198th Infantry Division, Colonel N.M. Martynchuk, the command staff immediately began to study the approaches to the front line of the enemy's defense, and the personnel - to check the condition of the combat vehicles and eliminate shortcomings after a hard march.

In everything - in working out the task, and in checking weapons, and in adjusting running gears - there was an upsurge. Only the day before the fight, 47 applications were submitted to the primary party organizations. Soldiers and officers wanted to go into battle as communists. (P. Egorov. "Through forests and swamps." Funds of the museum of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts, l.64).

On the morning of February 16, when the night shadows disappeared, the tanks roared forward. They were faced with the task of capturing Pogost together with units of the 198th Infantry Division and developing an offensive in the direction of Vinyagolovo.

This task, as it turned out, was not an easy one. First of all, because it has already been deployed to other formations more than once, and the offensive actions of our troops have already attracted attention and attracted enemy reserves. And secondly, the Nazis attached exceptional importance to this point in the system of their defense, covering the way to Leningrad. Here they created heavily fortified positions. In the embankment itself there were dugouts, bunkers, firing nests, rifle cells. Behind the embankment are the firing positions of mortars and artillery.

At 0900, the 1st tank battalion, consisting of 19 KV tanks under the command of Major N.M. Rybakov, reached the front line of the enemy's defense. Having ironed the dugouts and shelters, the tankers overcame the first position on the move, and then, having made a 1.5 km throw, broke into the second one.

At the same time, the 2nd tank battalion under the command of Major Paikin destroyed the enemy defenses west of Pogost.

By February 17, units of the 124th Tank Brigade approached Vinyagolov. But they could not master this point on the move. Having broken away from the infantry and not feeling the support of the artillery, the tankers were forced to stop. At the same time, the enemy forces continued to grow. By the end of the day, his tanks appeared. Artillery began to hit much harder.

Enemy bombers hovered over the battlefield. On February 18, the Nazis, feeling superior in strength, struck back.

Finding themselves without infantry and strong supply and communication lines, the tankers of the brigade were forced to withdraw.

February 23 was followed by a command to stop the attack. They didn't bring any success anyway. Parts of the 198th Rifle Division, pinned down by continuous enemy air raids, could not get off the ground, and the tanks of the 124th Tank Brigade, although they broke forward, were forced to return without infantry support.

In the area of ​​the Zharok junction, the battle continued. Having received replenishment, the 285th Infantry Division attacked the positions of the Germans with renewed vigor. The enemy resisted fiercely. In brutal martial arts these days, the combat glory of the machine gunner of the 1015th Infantry Regiment Pyotr Alekseevich Safonov, the first holder of the Order of Lenin in the division, was born.

Small in stature, a thin guy, in his company he was the son of many fighters. Elderly warriors took care of him. When hot moments came, they sent him either for cartridges or for food.

Safonov was eager for the real thing. He became friends with the machine gunners, stubbornly studied the machine gun and waited for an opportunity to try his skills in battle. And such an opportunity presented itself. In one battle, a machine-gun crew was killed by a mine that exploded nearby. Then Safonov lay down behind the machine gun.

The Nazis, who went on the counterattack, were almost there. But then a machine gun hit and forced them to roll back. The commander noted Safonov's resourcefulness and courage, and appointed the young soldier as a machine gunner.

CHAPTER 5. BATTLE ON THE DIRECTION OF THE MAIN STRIKE

Let us consider the combat operations of the 59th and 52nd armies on the first day of the re-offensive of the troops of the front. Both armies fought fierce battles on the flanks of the 2nd shock army. The divisions of the 59th Army, met with destructive fire, withdrew to their original positions.

Success was outlined only in the 15-kilometer offensive zone of the 52nd and 2nd shock armies. In the 52nd Army, the 305th Rifle Division again distinguished itself. By the end of the day on January 13, the soldiers of the division crossed the Volkhov and started fighting with the 250th Spanish division of the enemy, slowly advancing in the direction of the villages of Gorka and Lelyavino. To the north, following the 305th, the 46th and 267th Rifle Divisions of the 52nd Army crossed over and entered the battle on the west bank.

267th Rifle Division, brigade commander Ya.D. Zelenkova, formed in the Chernihiv region, advanced on the village of Gorka, which stood on the banks of the Volkhov. Along the steep bank, the Germans built bunkers, full profile trenches, barbed wire, minefields. On the morning of January 13, during artillery preparation, artillerymen blew up an ammunition depot in the village.

The 844th Infantry Regiment of the division attacked Hill 130.0 between Gorka and the Oneg pioneer camp. The regiment crossed the Volkhov, but on the right bank lay down under heavy enemy fire. The soldiers could not raise their heads. When it got dark, the Germans set fire to ten houses in Gorka to illuminate the approaches to the village. This crime of the enemy shocked our fighters. The commander of the battery of 76-mm guns, Lieutenant Krutikov, together with the calculation, rolled out one gun for direct fire and smashed the nearest two bunkers with several shells, from where heavy machine guns fired. Taking advantage of the fact that the enemy ceased fire, the regiment commander launched the 3rd battalion of senior lieutenant Z.A. Gagueva. To the right, the 1st battalion of senior lieutenant Ilyashevich rushed forward from the neighboring 848th rifle regiment. From two sides they burst into the village and engaged in hand-to-hand combat. The enemy fled, suffering heavy losses. Then the 846th Rifle Regiment drove the Germans out of the village of Nagornoye, and the 848th Regiment captured the pioneer camp and the villages of Starye and Novye Bystritsy north of Gorka with the second and third battalions. The bridgehead was captured. The regiments captured trophies: 4 mortars, 2 anti-tank guns, 14 heavy and light machine guns, rifles, a car, as well as an ammunition depot, where there were 1,500 shells, about 800 mortar mines, 150 thousand rifle cartridges, 300 grenades, lighting rockets. (Izmailov L.G. 267th Infantry Division in the battles on the Volkhov Front, LNO, pp. 213-214).

Scheme of the initial position for the offensive in the breakthrough sector of the 2nd shock army on 13.1.42

In the offensive zone of the 2nd shock army, luck accompanied the 327th rifle division of Colonel I.M. Antyufeev, formed in the Voronezh region. She was given the 44th separate ski battalion and the 839th howitzer regiment of the RGK. The 1098th Rifle Regiment, advancing from the eastern shore from the village of Gorodok, crossed the Volkhov at Krasnoye Poselok by 14:00 on January 13. By the evening of the 13th and on the night of January 14, the 1102nd Infantry Regiment, advancing from the eastern shore from the village of Dubovitsy, started a battle for the village of Kostylevo. The 1100th regiment occupied the heights on the western bank near the village of Bor, but could not occupy the village. Thus, the Voronezh troops penetrated the defenses of the German 126th Infantry Division in this area. Losses killed in the 327th division were small, but there were quite a lot of wounded - up to a thousand people. Among the dead was the commander of the 1098th regiment, Colonel P.Ya. Komarov. Russian Soviet poet P.N. Shubin, who at that time was a war correspondent for the Frontovaya Pravda newspaper, described his death in the poem "On the Northern River."

To the left of the Voronezh residents, the 58th separate rifle brigade of Colonel F.M. stubbornly tried to force the Volkhov. Zhiltsova with the 561st Artillery Regiment of the RGC attached to her. The offensive of the brigade developed with great difficulty. On the first day of the offensive, it was not possible to force the Volkhov.

The second rifle battalion of the brigade when moving to the eastern bank of the river. Volkhov was met with fire by unsuppressed firing points of the enemy in vil. Gorelovo. They stopped the advance of the battalion. The soldiers lay down. Together with the shooters, the crew of an anti-tank 45-mm gun moved.

The gunner, Red Army soldier Smyk Akim Alekseevich, began to fire at these firing points. One, which especially interfered with the advance of our infantry, he liquidated with his gun from the first shot. In addition, he himself destroyed several fascists. The suppression of this firing point made it possible for our infantry to advance further to the banks of the Volkhov. For this battle, the Red Army soldier Smyk A.A. was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. (TsAMO RF, f.33, o.682524, d.588, l.72).

After the advance of the main forces of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the brigade to the eastern bank of the Volkhov River, the enemy opened machine-gun and mortar fire. The movement stopped, the infantry lay down. The Germans in some places blew up the ice near the western bank of the river. Polynyas appeared. On the first day of the second offensive, the 23rd brigade failed to cross the Volkhov.

But on the left flank of the 2nd shock army, the 24th separate rifle brigade of Colonel M.V. was successful. Romanovsky. By 5 p.m. on January 13, her 1st battalion reached the western coast and began fighting to expand the bridgehead at Novaya Bystrica. (Agapov M.M. 23rd separate rifle brigade in the battle for Leningrad, 1999, pp. 13-14; TsAMO RF. f. 309, o. 4073, d. 2, ll. 75.78, d. 8. , l.8-9; f.1812. o.1, d.3, ll. 86-87).

On the morning of January 13, in accordance with the plan of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front under the command of Major General I.I. launched an offensive on Pogostye and Tosno. Fedyuninsky. With stubborn battles, she went towards the Volkhovites. She managed to advance 20 kilometers.

The neighbor on the left is the 11th Army of the North-Western Front under the command of Lieutenant General V.I. Morozova was already conducting offensive operations, as mentioned earlier, creating a threat on the southern flank of the Novgorod grouping of the enemy. At that time, the 11th Army approached Staraya Russa. Unfortunately, here she stopped, unable to take possession of the city. (Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people. - 1983, p. 249).

The next day, January 14, the 2nd shock army expanded the captured bridgeheads. Rifle brigades, which had seized small bridgeheads the day before, transferred their second echelons there. Finally, the 23rd and 58th rifle brigades managed to cross the Volkhov. 58th brigade at 4 o'clock. 30 minutes. on the morning of January 14, she reached the western bank of the Volkhov in the direction of the village. Yamno. In the 23rd brigade, a company of machine gunners and part of the forces of the 3rd rifle battalion crossed the Volkhov by 13 o'clock. They successfully advanced to vil. Plotishno. Behind them, other units of the brigade moved to the bridgehead. But at this time, the 23rd brigade received a personal order from the commander of the 2nd shock brigade to withdraw from the battle in its sector two separate rifle battalions with support units, artillery and mortars.

Under the command of the brigade commander and the military commissar, they were to head to the site of the 58th rifle brigade. They were given the task of helping build on the success of the 58th brigade and, together with it, capture the village and the German resistance center of Yamno. By 19 o'clock, parts of the brigade (1st and 3rd det.

rifle battalions, a company of anti-tank rifles, a separate communications battalion without one platoon, two reconnaissance platoons, a platoon of submachine gunners, six 76mm guns, a mortar battalion and a sapper company) were withdrawn from the battle in their sector and took up positions near the village. Yamno next to the 58th Infantry Brigade. They prepared to attack in the morning. The oral instruction of the commander was confirmed by combat order No. 03 of the army headquarters with a specification of the task: after the liberation of Yamno, capture the village. Borisovo, cut the road Myasnoy Bor - the state farm "Red Drummer" and destroy the enemy in the state farm. (TsAMO RF, f.309, o.4073, d.8, l.23).

Meanwhile, the 24th separate rifle brigade, operating at the junction with the 52nd army, fought off enemy counterattacks in the Gorelovo-Russ area during January 15th. On the main line of the 2nd shock army on the night of January 15, the 1st and 3rd divisions. The battalions of the 23rd Infantry Brigade, overcoming the enemy's stubborn fire resistance, entered the village of Yamno. Suffering significant losses, by 12.00 o'clock they advanced to its western outskirts (report of staff-23 to the headquarters of the 2nd shock army No. 7).

reported to the head of the political department of the Volkhov Front that:

"15. Red Army soldiers of the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Separate Rifle Brigade TT.

Bychkov and Merkulov were the first to break into the village of Yamno, occupied the dugout and at night, crawling from one dugout to another, knocked out the Germans from the dugouts with grenades, killed the officer, while seizing the officer's bag with documents, a pistol and other trophies. The Germans, taken by surprise, ran out of the dugouts without even having time to put on their greatcoats. (TsAMO RF, f.204, o.125, d.17, l.37-40; Agapov M.M. Ibid., p.14).

The headquarters of the 2nd shock army for the development of the offensive decided to enter the second echelon and ordered the commanders of the 58th and 23rd divisions. page of brigades to pass through their battle formations the reserve 53rd division. page brigade (commander - Major General V.S. Rakovsky), who received the task of capturing the Myasnoy Bor station.

At 12 noon on January 15, the 2nd division. p. battalion of the 53rd det. The brigades moved through the battle formations of the brigades that had already captured Yamno. But by this time the Germans had brought up to 500 submachine gunners and new weapons to the Yamno area. The Germans opened heavy fire on the advancing units. After that, the arrived machine gunners of the Nazis launched a counterattack. Entering the battle through the battle formations of the 23rd brigade, the 2nd battalion of the 53rd brigade could not withstand the sudden blow and ran back. At the same time, he carried away the fighters of the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 23rd brigade. The panic that arose in the 53rd brigade and spread to the battalions of the 23rd brigade led to the loss of the village. After that, Yamno had to be taken a second time.

The decisive actions of the senior instructor of the political department of the 23rd brigade of the battalion commissar A.D. Gerashchenko, who was in battle formations, helped our fighters "hook" on the outskirts of Yamno. He stopped some of the fighters, organized a group of them and led her into battle. They recaptured dugouts on the outskirts of Yamno. By order of the front commander No. 01 / n dated February 1, 1942 A.D. Gerashchenko was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for this feat. In the Gerashchenko group, the Red Army soldier M.T. Yakovlev. Under heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, he threw grenades at the German bunker, killing 12 Germans, and captured the firing point. Then he participated in the cleansing of another bunker from the Germans. This made it possible to keep the outskirts of the village. M.T. Yakovlev was awarded the medal "For Courage" on April 21, 1942 for this battle. Red Army soldier E.E. Galagan, gunner of the 76-mm gun of the 23rd brigade. He put forward his gun for direct fire and with accurate shooting knocked out the Germans from the bunkers, destroyed other firing points and manpower. By this he contributed to the retention of Yamno. The commander of the front, he was also awarded the medal "For Military Merit". (TsAMO RF, f.33, o.682524, d.588, l.42,178; f.408, o.10020, d.22, l.162).

Stubborn battles on January 15-16 were fought by the 327th Infantry Division. On the night of January 16, she liberated the villages of Bor, Kostylevo, Arefino, Krasny Poselok. There has been some success in breaking through the German defenses in the sector of the 58th division of the brigade with the assistance of the 23rd division of the brigade in the Yamno area. At the same time, the Germans put up stubborn resistance in the areas of rifle brigades located to the south, in the area of ​​Plotishno, Borisovo, the Krasny Udarnik state farm.

The commander of the 2nd shock army, by his order No. 056 of January 16, united Colonel F.M. Zhiltsov separate rifle brigades (23rd, 58th and 53rd) and ordered to destroy the enemy who had broken through into Yamno. To do this, two rifle companies of the 53rd division arrived in Yamno at night. brigade page. By this order, the "Southern Operational Group" of troops was created, which existed until the end of January (with the replacement of the 53rd brigade in it by the 24th). This was the first case of the practical organization of an operational group of troops as part of the 2nd shock army in order to more effectively lead the troops and improve the organization of the battle. Most likely, the “hint” of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command by Directive No. 03 of January 10, 1942 played a role.

(Agapov M.M. 23rd separate page brigade in the battle for Leningrad. 1999, p. 15).

The commander of the 2nd shock army decides to reinforce the troops in the area of ​​Yamno, Plotishno, which is promising for completing the breakthrough of the enemy's first line of defense. For this, the army headquarters planned the participation of the main force of the army - the 327th rifle division. On the evening of January 16, the headquarters of the 2nd shock army gave the following order (combat order No. 03) to the commanders of the 327th division and the 58th, 23rd and 24th divisions of the brigades: “The enemy, putting up stubborn resistance in sector 23 and 24 sbr, holds the western bank of the river. Volkhov. On the Yamno sector, exclusively Kolomno, the enemy front was broken through. The 327th Rifle Regiment with one rifle regiment with a company of tanks T firmly holding down and covering Bor, Kostylevo, Arefino, ... with two rifle regiments with reinforcement units striking the eastern edge of the forest west of the settlements along the river. Volkhov to the south and south-west, together with the 23rd, 24th and 58th rifle brigades, surround and destroy the enemy in the areas of the Krasny Udarnik state farm, Russa, followed by access to Myasnoy Bor, Lyubtsy. 23, 24 and 58 rifle brigades with access to the Lyubtsy line to form the second echelon of the army ... Actions begin at 7.00, 17.01.42. (TsAMO RF, f.309, o.4073, d.8, l.24).

While the battles for Yamno were going on, the sapper company of the 23rd brigade built winter crossings across the Volkhov in the YamnoShevelevo area in three days - on January 15. At 2 pm on January 17, a company of T-60 tanks (10 vehicles) crossed the river along these crossings and reached the eastern outskirts of Yamno. (TsAMO RF, f.1812, o.1, d.32, l.2; f.309, o.4073, d.14, l.38).

Although deep snow and fires in the village severely limited the action of light tanks, their arrival strengthened the morale of the fighters.

Reporting to General A.M. Vasilevsky about the results of the first two days of the offensive operations of the troops of the front, K.A. Meretskov noted with bitterness that our aviation had not yet fully assembled and that shells were being brought in with great interruptions. (TsAMO RF, f.204, o.89, d.21, ll.137-138). After that, our aviation rendered great assistance to the advancing troops, having made more than 1,500 sorties in a few days with the aim of striking at the enemy’s battle formations.

A few words about the air forces of the front. The units and formations included in them had good training and combat experience. In the battles for Tikhvin, our pilots shot down 134 enemy aircraft and destroyed 164 on the ground. Their main disadvantage was their small number.

By the beginning of the Luban operation, the front aviation consisted of only 118 aircraft, of which:

fighters - 71, attack aircraft - 19, dive bombers - 6, reconnaissance aircraft - 4 and U-2 - 18. (TsAMO RF, f.204, o.89, d.

It should be noted that in the first days of the operation, the aircraft fleet of the front was replenished with almost a hundred aircraft and increased to 211 units. But, unfortunately, almost exclusively by U-2 aircraft. These workers day and night supplied the troops with food and ammunition, took out the wounded, bombed enemy positions after dark. But, of course, they were not capable of solving the main tasks of defeating enemy troops.

“If the 2nd shock army was successful, then the offensive failed in the 4th and 59th armies. Their attacks became weaker and weaker over time, and then completely stopped. The neighbor of the Volkhov Front, the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, having used up ammunition, on January 17 also stopped offensive operations. She stopped at the turn of Mount Cannon, Lodva, st. Molux, Art. Pogost'e, Posadnikov Island, New Kirishi settlement.

In this situation, attacks on the right flank of the front meant a waste of strength. After my report, the Headquarters allowed to transfer all efforts in the direction of Spasskaya Polist and Lyuban. This direction then remained the main one for almost another half a year. That is why the whole operation began to be called Luban. (Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people. - M .: Nauka. 1983. - P. 250).

In accordance with this decision, the 4th Army, which had suspended the offensive, expanded its operational sector at the expense of the 59th Army, and the latter moved even further south, almost to the rear of the 2nd Shock Army.

CHAPTER 6

The section of the Zavizha front transferred to the 4th Army, Vyya increased the front of the army's combat operations by 10 km. Together with the site, two divisions (288th and 376th) and three ski battalions (47th, 48th and 50th) were transferred. In addition, the army with this site received another enemy foothold held by the enemy in the Gruzino region. This bridgehead, like the Kirishi one, was located in a sensitive area of ​​​​our defense and therefore immediately became a subject of special concern to the army command. At the end of January 1942, the army faced the task as a primary goal: to drop German troops not only from the Kirishi, but also from the Gruzinsky bridgeheads. General Lyapin (the new commander of the 4th Army) decided first to throw the Germans off the Georgian bridgehead. He brought the 65th Infantry Division of Colonel P.K. to the reserve. Koshevoy, replenished it with people and weapons, and then aimed at Gruzino to reinforce the positions of the 1218th Infantry Regiment of the 366th Infantry Division, which occupied there, to begin active operations against the bridgehead. The 1218th Rifle Regiment under the command of Major Zarub remained in the 4th Army at the place where the 366th Division fought, until it was transferred to the 2nd Shock Army. In Gruzino there were old Arakcheevsky barracks with deep cellars and even underground passages. The 65th Rifle Division and the 1218th Rifle Regiment were given the task, interacting with each other, to capture the Bolshevik state farm 4 km east of Gruzino and then advance on Gruzino.

Having organized reconnaissance, the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 1218th rifle regiment, Lieutenant Komkov, led his battalion around this German fortified point. This battalion, bypassing the state farm from the rear, captured the villages of Lyudnya, Khotilovo, Motylye, which created a threat for the enemy to intercept the approach to the state farm. Komkov's battalion came close to Gruzino.

At the same time, when Komkov's battalion and units of the 65th Infantry Division were bypassing the state farm from different sides, our mortars opened heavy frontal fire on the state farm. By this they misled the enemy, who considered him for artillery preparation and expected an attack from the front.

The battalion commander of the 1218th Infantry Regiment agreed on issues of interaction with units of the 65th Infantry Division. On the night of February 3, they simultaneously stormed the state farm. The Germans did not expect such an attack and began to retreat in disorder. At the same time, our troops captured trophies: one serviceable tank, two guns, other weapons and a lot of ammunition.

The state farm "Bolshevik", being on the dominant heights, occupied an advantageous position in relation to the Georgian bridgehead. The enemy fortifications were clearly visible from it and it was a convenient starting position for the development of the offensive. The Nazis understood this well.

Therefore, having gathered their strength, they again captured the state farm with a retaliatory attack. The command of the 4th Army, which did not expect such a quick loss of the newly conquered positions, demanded from the commander of the 65th Infantry Division, Colonel P.K. Koshevoy, return the state farm. The division was already preparing for this. Units of the 38th Infantry Regiment, under the command of Major I.E. Abramenko, in the evening of the same day, with a swift attack, the Nazis were driven out of the state farm. The enemy left up to 150 corpses on the battlefield.

On the morning of February 4, the battle broke out along the entire front of the Georgian bridgehead. The Nazis desperately resisted, but they could not hold back the pressure of our soldiers. By the morning of February 5, Gruzino was cleared of enemy troops. (TsAMO RF, f.204, o.89, d.98, l.17).

Only the former Arakcheev estate, located on a small island of the river, remained in the hands of the enemy. Volkhov, formed by an artificial channel. The palace and adjacent buildings, built in the style of medieval architecture, with thick stone walls and narrow windows the Germans skillfully adapted to the defense. This estate, which received the name "Arakcheevsky nest", subsequently cost our troops considerable sacrifices. Then, during the battles for Gruzino, the command of the 4th Army and the headquarters of the front apparently did not attach much importance to this estate and did not immediately take measures to capture it, but, on the contrary, immediately after the capture of Gruzino, i.e. On February 5, the front headquarters decided to withdraw the 65th rifle division from the battle and send it to the area of ​​\u200b\u200boperation of the front strike force. By the time they figured it out, it was already too late. The enemy took cover behind massive stone walls, threw up reserves and organized a fire system. Subsequently, General Lyapin wrote that "... the Arakcheev nest, the existence of which few of us even then knew, located on the island, remained uncleaned." (TsAMO RF, f.204, o.89, d.170, l.9).

It should be noted that the 4th Army during the Luban operation was a kind of source of reserves. So, on January 23, 191, 377 and 92 rifle divisions left its composition, a few days later the 4th Guards left, and on February 5 the 65th rifle division.

After the departure of the 65th division, remaining in the Gruzino area, the 288th division and the 1218th regiment tried for several more days to capture the "Arakcheevsky nest", but to no avail. They only managed to explore and study this estate. There was simply not enough strength to solve the problem. A few days later, the Nazis, having brought up fresh reserves, launched a furious counterattack through the area of ​​the Georgian park on the positions occupied by the 1218th regiment. Despite the fact that the regiment suffered heavy losses, it managed to repel a counterattack. Junior Lieutenant Burlak especially distinguished himself. He placed mortars in the houses on the outskirts of Gruzino and through the window openings the mortars began to fire at the attackers. Calculations failed. Burlak noticed that in the sector of fire from the mortar that fell silent to his right, the Nazis rushed to the attack. The junior lieutenant rushed to this mortar and began to work alone for the entire crew. By firing, he destroyed the attackers. 40 killed fascist soldiers - the result of the actions of junior lieutenant Burlak. The Nazi attack was repulsed.

The 1218th Rifle Regiment was withdrawn from the battle in Gruzino and sent to its 366th Rifle Division in the 2nd Shock Army only on February 23, 1942.

Attacks of the troops of the 4th Army in the Kirishi area and on the left bank of the river. Volkhov did not receive development. The loss of the Georgian bridgehead forced the enemy to turn Special attention to hold the Kirishi bridgehead.

The value of the Kirishi bridgehead has now increased even more. In a hurry, the Germans reinforced the garrison, increased the number of gun and machine-gun emplacements. A significant amount of artillery was redirected by them from the left bank of the river. Volkhov to support the Kirishi garrison.

The offensive capabilities of the 4th Army were continuously decreasing.

To draw the attention of the front commander to this fact, General Lyapin, on February 13, 1942, reported: the total number of the army is 17009 people, of which only 5950 people are fighting, 89 field and 14 anti-tank guns, 9 mortars, 55 heavy machine guns. (TsAMO RF, f.294, o.97, d.20, l.54).

Given that the army held an 80-kilometer front, an offensive with a decisive goal was out of the question. She in best case could conduct active defense on the occupied lines. It was to this conclusion that both the army commander and the front commander came. Meretskov knew what forces were transferred to other armies and what was left on this sector of the front. The commander of the front, on the report of the commander-4, imposed a resolution allowing him to confine himself to private operations and active intelligence. (P. Egorov. Through forests and swamps, pp. 36-43, funds of the Museum of the Volkhov Front.; TsAMO RF, f. 204, f. 97, d. 20, f. 54).

CHAPTER 7. CONTINUATION OF COMBAT ACTIONS ON THE MAIN DIRECTION

Further describing the fighting on the central sector of the Volkhov Front, it should be noted that after the decision to transfer all efforts to the direction of Spasskaya Polist and Lyuban, it was here that “a grouping of troops from three armies was created. In the center, on a 15-kilometer section of the front, the 2nd shock army was advancing, to the right of it - the 59th army, having a strike force on its left flank, to the left of the 2nd shock army - the main forces of the 52nd army .. Thus, by the course of events, an amendment was made to the plan of operation. The main blow was directed to bypass the fortified positions of the enemy, and Lyuban remained the closest target of the advancing troops of the front. (Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people. - M .: Nauka.

– 1983, p. 250).

With the emerging success in the sector of the 2nd shock army of the commander, he ordered the commander N.K. Klykov, on the morning of January 15, to bring into battle the second echelon of the army (two rifle brigades 53 and 59) and by the end of the day reach the line of the Chudovo-Novgorod railway. (TsAMO RF, f.204, o.89, d.108, ll.254-255).

The actions of the 53rd brigade, brought into battle from the second echelon in the Yamno region, showed that these forces were too weak and could not provide a turning point in our favor.

To intensify the strike, by order of the front commander, the 59th separate rifle brigade under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Chernik was put into battle in the sector of the 327th division. Of interest is the formation of the brigade, which began at the end of October 1941 in the PriVO with a formation center in the village of Dergachi, the regional center of the Saratov region. Conditions for formation were far from the best.

In addition to the school building, adapted to accommodate the headquarters of the brigade, there were no other buildings to accommodate the emerging units and subunits. The personnel were quartered in peasant houses with. Dergachi and surrounding villages. This had a negative effect on the preparation and cohesion of units. The formation of the brigade was led by senior battalion commissar I.Kh. Venets, brigade commissar. The brigade commander and chief of staff arrived at the brigade only on the 20th of December - a day or two before the first echelon was sent to the active army. During the formation of the brigade, they were able to conduct the only exercise on the topic “March and Encounter Battle”. At the same time, a suddenly rising snowstorm and a snow blizzard, in a completely open steppe, prevented its successful completion, because. frostbite began. Poorly during the formation received weapons and materiel. The brigade received guns and mortars, part of rifles and machine guns only in Yaroslavl at the station. Vspole. Warm underwear, padded jackets and quilted trousers were also received here. All this affected the quality of the first combat operations of the brigade.

According to the commissar of the Wentz brigade, the privates and sergeants were excellent. 500 people of communists and Komsomol members were received, unarmored and sent to the brigade as ordinary political fighters. They cemented the party and Komsomol organizations of units and subdivisions. Command staff, including commanders of units and subdivisions, as well as political workers, were called up from the reserve and had no combat experience.

The first echelon arrived at its final destination, the Nebolchi station on December 31, 1941. Further, following on foot, with deep snow drifts, clearing the way for transport and military equipment, the units moved along the Msta River to Malaya Vishera. By January 11, the brigade approached the destination. She received the task of entering the gap at the turn of the villages of Bor, Kostylevo and, acting on the rear of the Germans, move to the second line of defense of the Germans in order to cut the Novgorod-Chudovo railway in the section Myasnoy Bor - Spasskaya Polist and take Spasskaya Polist on the move. Already when crossing the Volkhov, the enemy fired at the brigade with shrapnel and inflicted heavy losses. On the west coast, German aircraft bombed her marching columns. On the morning of January 15, the brigade went on the offensive, but there was no sudden strike, because. it was discovered by the Germans the day before. In addition, the Germans threw into the rear of the brigade a group of submachine gunners who managed to cause some panic in the brigade. The commander and staff officers went to the battalions and eliminated the panic. After that, with great difficulty, the brigade was still able to push the enemy, however, the combat mission was not completed. The brigade commander for the loss of control of the battle by the Military Council of the 2nd shock army was removed from his post and replaced by Colonel V.F. Glazunov. The brigade was withdrawn again to the second echelon for replenishment (Venets I.Kh. On the battles of the 59th division of the brigade in the Luban operation. Manuscripts of reports and messages at the military-historical conference.

Leningrad, ss. 98-130).

The 2nd shock army, being weak in its initial composition, felt the need for reinforcement from the first steps. To strengthen it, on January 15, the front commander reassigned to it the rifle divisions that were previously part of the 59th Army: the 382nd Colonel G.I. Sokurov and 366th Colonel S.N. Bulanova. The latter was transferred without one of its rifle regiments (1218). This regiment was involved in the battles for the Georgian bridgehead and therefore temporarily remained part of the 4th Army. Section of the front with the Georgian bridgehead by decision of com.

front was transferred from the 59th Army to the 4th. From that moment on, the 2nd Shock Army began to include three rifle divisions.

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Letters from veterans of the 305th Infantry Division about the Luban operation

Several decades have passed, and the pain of the experienced, now distant, 1942 in the "valley of death" does not subside. This is also evidenced by letters to me from veterans who participated in those events, who miraculously survived and got out of the tenacious clutches of death that awaited them in this valley. I received a letter dated May 4, 1980 from the former secretary of the party bureau of the division, who commanded the firing platoon of the battery of the 305th rifle division, junior political instructor, and later lieutenant Nikolai Grigoryevich Bogdanov, who lived in the city of Zubtsovo, Tver region, a teacher by profession.

“Hello, dear brother-soldier Alexander Semenovich!

It has been 35 years since Nazi Germany was defeated. I still dream of the nightmarish days of experiences in the Novgorod swamps. I, like you, tried to get out of the encirclement, but the circumstances were such that the ending was sad. Our division command refused to take the junior command staff into its group, and we spontaneously organized into small groups and headed in different directions .... Our group stumbled upon a dense enemy barrier, and we were captured near the village of Podberezye. In total, 29 thousand people were captured. Among the prisoners were the commissar of our division Eisenstadt, the commander of the 830th artillery regiment and others from the senior command staff.

In late December or early January 1942, three students from Sverdlovsk arrived in our division, who had completed short-term courses Sherstnev Evgeny Petrovich, a student at an industrial institute; Volodya Artamonov from the Sverdlovsk Mining Institute; Gordeev (he, as I remember, from the Ryazan region). Then the fourth arrived - Leonid Abramovich Zalgaller - a student at the Leningrad Institute of Architecture. Senior Lieutenant Sherstnev was the battery commander, Senior Lieutenant Zalgaller was the command and control platoon commander, Senior Lieutenants Artamonov was the division communications chief, and Gordeev was the firing platoon commander.

Their fate is that they were all captured. L. A. Zalgaller (he was very similar to Y. Sverdlov) was shot by the Germans as a Jew. Gordeev and Artamonov were shot when they wanted to get something out of food and ran out of the column. Such is the fate of these young people. As now I see before me a handsome, energetic Artamonov, who dreamed of continuing his studies after the war; Zalgaller was an excellent reader and erudite on many issues.

I personally would like to hear from comrades Novikov and Zlatkin at the meetings of veterans of the 305th Infantry Division in Novgorod the whole truth about the tragedy that happened, and why Zlatkin escaped encirclement. This is the desire of all present. But you will not hear an answer to this question from them, it is unprofitable for them to reveal their cards. After all, what happened a week before the encirclement? The commander of the division of Drummers with his adjutant on the plane (the reason is illness) fly to the mainland. He is followed by the chief of staff Nikolaevsky, and then - lower rank.

Was it in the history of the Russian army to leave the army to its own devices? An example of this is Field Marshal A.V. Suvorov.

I don't know if you agree with me, but that's my opinion.
May my revelation remain between us.

Sincerely, N. G.

Too meager information I told you, dear Alexander Semyonovich, and much time has passed, memory has not retained everything seen and experienced. If there is a meeting, then, I hope, we will talk about many things.
Health to you and all the best in your life.

With respect to you.
Fellow soldier N. Bogdanov.

***

V. A. Kuznetsov, in 1941-1944 the executive secretary of the editorial office of the newspaper "Brave Warrior" of the 2nd Shock Army, in the article "The Beginning of the Road" describes his exit from the encirclement on June 25, 1942. “In the evening of the same day (06/25/42. - A.D.) I reported to the head of the propaganda and agitation department of the political department of the front, Brigadier Commissar Zlatkin, about the fate of the editorial board.” So this is where our head of the political department of the 305th Infantry Division Zlatkin "disappeared", that is, he went on promotion.

From the letters of the deputy foreman of the 4th battery of the 830th artillery regiment, Sergei Yakovlevich Kutkin:

“Dear Alexander Semenovich!

Thank you for your congratulations on the holiday and I always wait for a letter from you, but you write very rarely. You ask how I live, there is nothing to brag about, and the most painful and difficult time comes when I get into the past wartime of our division and its tragic days. Endless questions come into my head: why did this happen, did they really not know where they were climbing with such forces? Was there any other territory for helping Leningrad, besides these swamps, impassable in the summer? Who guarded this valley of death, why was it necessary to get into this bag, why was the passage not widened? These are the questions that enter your head, and the night becomes sleepless, and you yourself become sick.

More than 40 years have passed since that tragic time, and the remains of our best comrades who gave their lives for the honor and independence of our Motherland have not yet been removed and buried. Truly, no one is forgotten!

Sasha, you are interested in how I got captured. After we were given the command to leave in small groups and as best we could, and such a command was given by the junior lieutenant of communications of our battery, I wanted to join him. He ordered us to leave separately. It was late in the evening of June 25 or 26, not far from the narrow-gauge road and the flat road, where the three of us were guarding our three guns without a single shell and battery utility carts. I had to take out the gun locks, wrap them up and bury them in different places, as well as the gun panoramas. The wagons were doused with kerosene and set on fire. They tried to go to the isthmus - to the exit, but it was already too late. Then we, five people, decided to look for the partisans, but not knowing where they were, not having a map, not knowing the area, we wandered for several days in the rear of the Germans without food. We ran into a minefield, where one person was killed and one slightly wounded, after which we went deep into the territory occupied by the enemy and went south. On the way we met a small group of Germans, a skirmish ensued, the cartridges ran out, and we broke away from the German group and wandered in the forest without food and ammunition until July 6 or 7. We went to a forest lodge somewhere 4–5 km from Novgorod. One of us crawled to the garden where the old woman was. The woman showed the direction where we should go. After a little rest, we moved a little away from the hut, and we were surrounded by Germans with dogs and Russian volunteers. It was useless and there was nothing to resist, and we could barely move our legs. They took away our rifles and documents and took us to Novgorod, where they placed us in a camp. There were a lot of prisoners of war in the camp. It consisted of several sectors. The commanders were in one sector, and the Red Army soldiers were in another. There I saw the commander of the 830th artillery regiment and other commanders.

They fed us very badly, drove us to work. Soon they selected a team of prisoners of war, which included me, and took me away. We were unloaded near the village of Maloe Zamoshye to build a flat road (pasta). We set up our large sanitary tent, surrounded it with wire in several rows. and set up watchtowers all around. There I was swollen from hard work in the water, and the Germans wanted to shoot me as a simulator. But one non-commissioned officer stood up for me (I don’t know why he liked me). I was put out of action and taken to the medical instructor. A car came, and I was taken to Novgorod to a hospital for Russians, where I lay until July-August 1943. When our people began to advance, we were all taken to Luga, then to the Baltic states, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, Stettin, and then to Norway to build a railway. There we were liberated by the British. The war ended in 1945, we were barely alive, we could barely move our legs - old people and a bunch of lice.

Our Russian general arrived, the guards were removed. We began to protect ourselves. The general told us: “You will be transferred to your homeland after you become like people. Do not rush home, let them (the English) bring you into human form. We were all given English and gradually began to increase our food. For some, we ourselves committed lynching. The Norwegians treated us differently, sometimes they gave us some food. Then a ship came, we were all loaded and brought to Murmansk. Sanitation, the first state check, and then to the city of Kozelsk for the second state check, after which they were selected for the reserve 40th artillery regiment. They issued Red Army books and military uniforms. They loaded us with the commanders into the wagon and to the front in Japan, but for now, back and forth, the war with Japan was over, and we were sent with the commanders to the mines in the Moscow region. I retired only in November 1948 due to disability of the II group - jade. He came home, went to work at the plant as a turner, where he worked until 1976. Everything passed, but still not the same.

Decide for yourself how I felt, whether it was good.

Write, always happy. Your Sergey.

I'm sorry I write so badly. I can’t calmly think about it, undeserved dirt was poured on us.

Write, I will be glad to your letter.
Goodbye. Kutkin.

***

From a letter from S. Ya. Kutkin dated May 14, 1985: “Our brother-soldier Bogdanov N. G. wrote about a gift he received on the day of the 40th anniversary of the Victory, and in this letter he spoke about his grief: he expected to receive an addition to his pension of 5 rubles, but he was refused. They said that allegedly his continuous work experience was interrupted. As he writes, in 1950 he worked as an inspector of the district. August 29 The district announced to him that he, as a former prisoner of war, could not hold this position, and suggested that he apply for release. N. G. Bogdanov wrote a statement, and this was the reason for refusing to give him a bonus. But on the same day - August 29, he was appointed a teacher of mathematics. The district is one and the same, where is the justice? You can't lead adults, but you can raise children?? So prove that you fought and shed blood at the front, echoes of the past.

I firmly press your hand. S. Kutkin. 21/VI-85

How much more is unknown, hidden from the people.

It's a shame why everything is impossible, the whole truth for the people.

Sasha, come on, rouse the people to the last “assault” of the tragic Zamosze swamps, and what have hacks written for more than 40 years about our fate?
Write. Kutkin.

Sergei Yakovlevich wanted to once again visit the site of past battles.

“Hello, Alexander Semenovich!

A. Z. Milman gave me your address.

I remember you as the commander of the 5th battery of the 830th artillery regiment. Before the encirclement, I acted as a foreman of this battery, and was removed from this job with you. In my place, you appointed N.I. Kazhokhin, if you remember such a person, but I was sent back as a rider, and then to the infantry to take up defense on the Polist River. At that time we were encircled in the Zamosze Marshes. I stayed surrounded until June 15th. Two of my comrades N. V. Ilyin and N. L. Romanov died of starvation, but by some miracle I survived. Then I was sent to the reserve regiment to recover. Finished the war in Latvia. By decree on the demobilization of senior military personnel 06/23/45. was demobilized and on July 20, 1945 was already at home in the Kalinin region, in the Staritsky district. From 1946 to 1969 he worked as the chairman of a collective farm in his homeland. In 1964 he retired. I already I am 75 years old, I live in Kalinin, I still work in the regional hospital as a supply manager.

When they were still being formed in the city of Dmitrov near Moscow, I remember the commander of the regiment Gorodovikov, the commander of the division Domnich and our all respected commander of the 5th battery Mikhail Petrovich Rotinov, who was already recalled in March 1942 as a cameraman to Moscow.

The commissar of the division was Dolinsky, a young guy of your age, who, according to rumors, shot himself. In our battery, the commissar was a Belarusian, a young guy, I don’t remember his last name, he didn’t know military affairs at all. During the entire war, I was wounded four times. Three wounds - bullet wounds, not touching the bones, and the fourth - shrapnel in the neck, from which I was unconscious for seven hours.

On New Year's Eve I went by car to Leningrad. I drove past the places where an evil fate befell us, drove to the Myasnoy Bor station, looked where the river was being crossed. Volkhov near the state farm. He bowed to all the comrades who remained lying in the ground, and with a bitter aftertaste came home to Kalinin. Apparently, we will never forget the misfortune and grief we endured in these places.

I end with this. I would be very grateful if you make me happy with your answer.

Goodbye, regards,
Vinogradov Sergey Osipovich.
01/10/80. Kalinin.

***

I remember that in the May days of 1942, the commissar of this battery came to the observation post of the commander of the 120-mm mortar battery, senior lieutenant Evgeny Petrovich Sherstnev, and had a conversation with all his battery members, and we, representatives of the 5th battery of the 830th artillery regiment, also took part in this event. In the end, this commissar (I unfortunately forgot his last name) said: “After the war, every adult will be asked: what did you do during the war for the Victory?”

(We had no doubts about our victory over Nazi Germany). “For example, they will ask me,” the commissar continued, “what did you do for the Victory? And I’ll tell them: “What else did you want from me?” And they, in turn, will answer: "Oh, excuse us, please excuse us." And they will continue to question others.”

We, present at this conversation, firmly believed that there would be such a survey of everyone! Everyone will be asked what he did for the Victory! Everyone's personal contribution to the Great Victory will be appreciated and will become known to everyone. Truly, as in the song: “At the table, no one is superfluous, everyone is awarded according to their merits!”.

In the end, no one was interested in anyone. As always, with rare exceptions, the winners were those who were far from the front line and occupied “warm” places, retained their health, and very soon after the war these people began to look arrogantly and indifferently at us, former comfrey workers.

Such persons, far from fighting, as in a fiery corridor, have one opinion - Vlasov surrendered the 2nd Shock Army to the Germans.

Goebbels as an ideologist of fascism can be understood. He was our sworn enemy and therefore tried in every possible way to discredit the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. He was convinced that there is a law, the essence of which is expressed in the fact that the more terrible the lie, the more willingly people believe in it. And so Goebbels announced that the 2nd Shock Army, together with his general Vlasov, had surrendered to the German troops. Stalin needed such a lie, oh how, to hide his miscalculations and obvious short-sightedness in the leadership of the troops, and he picked up this dirty fake and passed it off as reality, which turned out to be very tenacious.

Look carefully at the composition of the army, think about what you would do if you were asked to lay down your arms?
And you will come to one conclusion: it is impossible to surrender the army. Voronov - the cook - can, but the army - never.

On July 5, 1942, the head of the logistics of the 2nd Shock Army reported to the Military Council of the front: “The personnel were exhausted, pushing the materiel out of the swamps towards the narrow gauge railway and the lay road. Prior to this, for a month and a half, the army was on a starvation ration. There were no stocks of ammunition and food in the army, since there was no supply due to lack of fuel ... On May 30, on the territory occupied by the army, there were 1,500 wounded on platforms and in wagons, and 450 civilians in the forest awaiting evacuation (civilians were forced to evacuate, and their houses were burned so that the enemy would not get it. - A.D.)

On July 7, by decision of the Army Armed Forces, 80% of the personnel were put into operation, including artillerymen and mortarmen. However, the army was not successful due to the lack of ammunition and poorly organized interaction with units advancing from the east ... The personnel received 30-40 grams of crackers a day, the wounded - 70-80 grams per person. The only food is horse meat. However, because of enemy aircraft, it was impossible to make fires, and horse meat was eaten raw, without salt. Exhaustion. Mortality in parts, especially in hospitals and among the civilian population.

From June 20 to 29, 3.5–4 thousand people left the encirclement, 2,500 from combat units. Approximately 32 thousand remained. In total, on June 20, 1942, the army had 40 thousand people. The detached units of the 52nd and 59th armies after the closure of the passage amounted to 12-15 thousand people, and in total there were 50-55 thousand on allowance.

I think the reasons for the death of the army are:

1) lack of ammunition, hunger, due to which the army, despite the exceptional heroism and dedication of all personnel, could not hold back the onslaught of superior enemy forces, giving him the opportunity to squeeze the ring to the limit;

2) lack of help from the east;

3) I consider it necessary to appoint a government commission to study the death of the army and identify those responsible.

“On June 28, Hitler was informed of the victorious end of the Volkhov battle. The report reported that 32,759 of our soldiers were taken prisoner.
What losses did our troops suffer in the Luban operation?

Human losses in battles:

The 54th Army of the Leningrad Front was advancing towards the 2nd Shock Army in the direction of Lyuban. She was also a member of the Luban offensive operation (January 7 - April 20, 1942). The army advanced 25 km in these battles. At the small station of Pogostye, the spring of 1942 opened the stacks of those killed during the autumn and winter.

“Soldiers in summer uniforms, in tunics and boots, were lying near the ground, marines in pea coats and wide bell-bottoms were piled up on them. Above - Siberians in sheepskin coats and felt boots, who went on the attack in January-February 1942. Even higher are political fighters in padded jackets and rag hats issued in besieged Leningrad ... ”(from the article“ Desecrated Shrines ”).

A soldier of the Volkhov Front, and now a professor, curator of the Netherlandish painting of the Hermitage N.N. Nikulin suggests: “I would like to shoot this picture for history and hang it in the offices the mighty of the world this for edification. But, of course, they didn't. It is customary to attribute responsibility for unprecedented losses to the enemy, and high-ranking leaders were often awarded and promoted.

I would like the words of A. Tvardovsky to come true:

And the memory of that, probably
My soul will be sick
While the misfortune is irrevocable,
There will be no war for the world.

It is these words, as an epigraph, given by I.A. Ivanova in the book "The Tragedy of Myasny Bor".

“According to the report of the NSH of the 2nd Shock Army, Colonel Vinogradov, encrypted on 06/21/42, the number and combat composition of the 2nd Shock Army as of 06/21/42. was: people - 23 401.

Note: The information does not include the 19th Guards Rifle Division, the 92nd Rifle Division and the 31st Guards Mortar Regiment.
As of 06/29/42. for the river Volkhov, 3,087 people were withdrawn, including 56 people from the 305th Infantry Division.

682 healthy people were bred on 22.06.42.
3,087 healthy people were bred on June 29, 1942.
The wounded and sick were taken out - 9,462 people (about 45%).

From the beginning of the withdrawal of troops of the 2nd Shock Army to the main defensive line and until 06/26/42, the enemy lost at least 30,000 soldiers and officers in front of the front of the 2nd Shock Army. About 50 tanks were destroyed and knocked out and 20 planes were shot down. The troops of the 59th and 52nd armies defeated units of the 1st infantry division, units of the 58th infantry division and the 505th medical battalion.

In total, the enemy lost about 45,000 soldiers and officers killed and wounded, about 60 tanks were knocked out and destroyed, and more than 20 aircraft were shot down.

Second Shock in the battle for Leningrad. L., 1983. P. 107.

Ivanova I. A. From the compiler // Tragedy of Myasny Bor: Sat. memories of participants and eyewitnesses of the Luban operation. SPb., 2001. S.16–17.

There. P.18.

The seal of secrecy has been removed. Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts: Stat. research M., 1993. S. 224–225, tab. 75.

Golovanova N. On the Other Side of the Tragedy: On the 55th Anniversary of the Complete Lifting of the Siege of Leningrad // Nevskoe Vremya. 1999.

Submitted material for publication:
Vladimir Alexandrovich Dobrov

To be continued.

The Luban offensive operation of the Red Army launched on January 7, 1942 had the goal of breaking through the German defenses, breaking through to the rear of the 1st Army Corps, cutting it off, capturing Lyuban and further operating in the direction of Leningrad to lift the blockade. In winter, units of the Volkhov Front managed to cross the Volkhov, gain a foothold and make a hole in the German defenses, which made it possible to introduce formations into the rear of the Germans to storm Lyuban. By March, units of the 2nd Shock Army advanced 75 km to the west, reaching the Rogavka railway station, and 40 km to the north, 6-10 km before reaching Lyuban. The front of the army stretched for 200 km. The order to advance further along a sparsely populated wooded and swampy area led to the formation of the "Luban bottle" with an area of ​​​​approx. 3 thousand sq. km. with a narrow neck in the place of a breakthrough - 11-16 km wide and approx. 4 km long from. the village of Myasnoy Bor to the village of Krechno. In early March, the Germans, having recovered from the Soviet offensive, prepared forces to strike at the supply corridor for the Red Army troops. On March 15, 1942, from the north, the corridor was attacked from Spasskaya Polist by 4 SS "Polizen", 61 infantry divisions and 121 infantry divisions. From the south, west of Myasny Bor, 58 infantry divisions and 126 infantry divisions attacked. Thus began Operation Raubtier (Predator). 03/18/42 - the northern group cut the northern supply road ("Erika"), and on 03/19/42 - the southern group captured the second and last road ("Dora"). By March 20, the groups closed steel tongs. After the capture, cut-off positions along the Glushitsa and Polist rivers began to be prepared. Parts of the encircled armies tried to break through the corridor back. Until May 31, when the ring closed completely, the corridor continued to change hands. At least 6 times it was punched back. During these periods, it pulsated to a width of 2.5 km to several hundred meters. Under shelling and crossfire, the meager supply of the encircled units was resumed. On May 14, the Headquarters allowed the halted offensive to be stopped and the troops of the 2nd UA to be withdrawn to the prepared line of Olkhovka - Lake. Tigoda. And on May 22, an order was given to withdraw the army from the encirclement. Seeing the retreating units, the Germans made fierce attempts to pull off the neck of the Luban "sack". In the new offensive, 254 Spanish infantry divisions, 61 infantry infantry divisions, 121 infantry infantry divisions, 4 SS TDs, 58 infantry divisions, 20md and 2 pb SS closed the corridor on May 31, 1942, leaving 9 divisions and 6 brigades surrounded by three regiments of RGK 2UA, 52A and 59A - just ok. 50,000 people. The surrounded units were subjected to artillery, mortar and air bombardment. But still, the Soviet armies tried to get out of the encirclement. On 06/22/42, 2UA units managed to withdraw approx. 7000 people through a narrow corridor. And already 25.06. the military council divided the armies into separate groups for an independent breakthrough. According to the General Staff, by July 1, 9,600 people managed to get out. But already on June 28, 1942, Hitler was informed of the victory in the battle of Volkhov. The Germans got 649 guns, 171 tanks and 32,759 soldiers were captured. Of these, 793 are health workers. In general, the Luban operation cost us 403,000 losses, of which 150,000 were irretrievably lost.

Leningrad in forty-two (excerpt)

Blocking the ring of blockades,
Our hearts are beating.
These are the Galanians among the forests
Silently go with hostility;
It's fascist dogs plast
Gusev blades;
These are the scouts on the trail
Blind freeze in a blizzard;
This is Bulanov in a thin hut
Listening to the wind in the chimney
New conceived fight
To get through to you, to you
To your bright, to a difficult fate,
To get along with you! Dubovik. February 15-16, 1942

Late 1941 - early 1942. The most difficult time for Leningraders, squeezed by the steel ring of the blockade: hunger, no light, no heating. Citizens go to the Neva for water. On the streets - two-meter snowdrifts, there are trams. Getting out of their last strength, people pull on sleds to bury their loved ones.

From Voronya Gora and from other heights, the Nazis systematically shelled the city. The vents of long-range Krupp guns are aimed at the Hermitage and St. Isaac's Cathedral, at the Public Library and the Admiralty, at bridges and railway stations, at residential buildings, schools, theaters, at the busiest squares and crossroads ...

During these days, everyone was thinking about how and how to help the people of Leningrad who were in big trouble.

The offensive operation of the Soviet troops of the Volkhov Front and part of the forces of the Leningrad Front. On January 7, Soviet troops went on the offensive. The enemy offered stubborn resistance. Only by January 17, Soviet troops broke through the first defensive line of the enemy. By the end of January, they managed to cut the Novgorod-Leningrad railway and reach the approaches to Lyuban. Only in March, having broken through the enemy defenses west of Kirishi, did Soviet troops reach the approaches to Lyuban from the northeast.

Meanwhile, the German command regrouped its troops, which dramatically changed the balance of power in the Luban direction. On April 30, Soviet troops stopped their offensive in the Lyuban region and went on the defensive.

The idea of ​​the operation - to encircle and destroy the Luban grouping of enemy troops and subsequently go to the rear of the German troops blockading Leningrad from the south - failed due to shortcomings in the organization of the offensive, lack of weapons and other materiel.

The German command could accumulate strength and bring down a blow on the city that its defenders simply could not parry. The only means of influencing the situation in the hands of the Soviet command were the troops on the outer ring of encirclement. Only by their actions could the main forces of Army Group North be pulled away from Leningrad. Ideally, the troops of the Volkhov Front were supposed to force the enemy to withdraw from Leningrad under the threat of encirclement and thereby restore communications between the country and the city. Therefore, the command of the Volkhov Front had no opportunity to choose a strategy: it was only necessary to advance.

In the second half of February1942 the Soviet command continued to concentrate forces for an offensive onLuban , on the way to which lay the village of Krasnaya Gorka, located at a height. The first to enter the battles for Krasnaya Gorka80th Cavalry Division , 39th And 42nd ski battalions.

FROM 25 February Soviet troops continued their offensive on Lyuban, but were subjected to a severe air raid, from which not only the troops of the shock group suffered, but also the units remaining at the base of the breakthrough. While the offensive of the 2nd shock army bogged down, the54th Army . She also managed to break through the defenses and get closer to Lyuban, taking a number of stronghold villages. However, the lack of coordination in the actions of the armies made it impossible to achieve operational success.

9th of March on the Volkhov Front, including to coordinate the activities of the fronts, a delegation arrived, which includedK. E. Voroshilov , G. M. Malenkov , A. A. Vlasov , A. A. Novikov , A. E. Golovanov , S. I. Rudenko . However, the moment was already lost: more2nd of March at a meeting with A. Hitler it was decided to go on the offensive on the Volkhov toMarch 7.

The Lyuban operation was conceived by the Soviet command in the form of a deep breakthrough with the simultaneous encirclement of the defensive line at the turn of the river. Volkhov grouping of the enemy. With their adjacent flanks, the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were supposed to strike in converging directions on Tosno. Thus, two birds with one stone were killed - breaking through the blockade and encircling the enemy grouping directly carrying out the blockade. It was considered inappropriate to break through a narrow corridor to the city along one of the railway lines or along the banks of Ladoga. The front in the Leningrad region was supposed to move westward throughout the entire space from Lake Ilmen to Lake Ladoga, and in the future - to the Gulf of Finland, thereby returning to the situation of August 1941.

January 4, 1942 can be considered the first day of the Luban operation. The 54th Army of the Leningrad Front launched an offensive with the forces of five rifle, one tank (without tanks) divisions, one rifle brigade, one marine brigade, one tank - brigade and three artillery regiments of the RGK. She went on the offensive from the line of Voronovo - Maluksa - the southern coast of the Sokolii Mokh swamp in the general direction of Tosno. For several days, army troops unsuccessfully tried to break through the defenses

Events unfolded even more dramatically in the offensive zone of the Volkhov Front. By the appointed date of the offensive - January 7, 1942 - the army artillery of the 2nd shock army did not arrive, aviation did not concentrate, and stocks of ammunition were not accumulated. Moreover, the only fresh division of the army, the 327th rifle division of I.M. Antyufeev, did not participate in the battles on the first day of the offensive.

However, without waiting for the full concentration of troops, the armies of the Volkhov Front went on the offensive at 10.00 am on January 7. Forcing on separate sections of the river. Volkhov, the troops of the armies suffered heavy losses in the battles for coastal settlements, not having the strength to develop success in depth.

Subsequent attempts to continue the offensive were unsuccessful. Time after time, the troops of the two armies clung to the western bank of the Volkhov, tried to develop the offensive in depth, but were thrown back by enemy counterattacks.

In general, during February - the first half of March 1942, battles for strongholds continued along the entire perimeter of the breakthrough of the 2nd shock army and in the zone of action: Soviet troops, lacking supplies (especially inside the breakthrough zone), desperately stormed them, trying to carry out breakthrough, the German troops also defended themselves desperately, realizing the value of strongholds, successfully maneuvering and providing air and artillery support. The attackers did not manage to achieve any significant success anywhere.

As a result of the Luban operation, the Novgorod-Chudovo broad gauge railway was cut. This forced the Germans to build a bypass narrow-gauge railway 72 km long, which received the code name Zvezda. Therefore, despite the fact that neither side achieved a decisive result in the winter campaign of 1942, the general situation near Leningrad changed in favor of the Soviet troops - the immediate threat to the city was eliminated for a long time.